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I. INTRODUCTION

The International Conference on Air Law, convened under the
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
met in Montreal during the period September 3 to 25, 1975. The
conference adopted four protocols' pertaining to the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, previously amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955' and the Guatemala
City Protocol of 1971' and supplemented by the Guadalajara
1 a) Additional Protocol No. 1, ICAO Doc. 9145 (1975).
b) Additional Protocol No. 2, ICAO Doc. 9146 (1975).
c) Additional Protocol No. 3, ICAO Doc. 9147 (1975).
d) Montreal Protocol No. 4, ICAO Doc. 9148 (1975).
2
Warsaw Convention signed Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter, Warsaw Convention]. As of December 31,
1975, 101 states were parties to the Warsaw Convention. For bibliography on

Warsaw Convention up to 1971 see W.

HEERE, INTERNATIONAL BIBuIORAPHY ON

AIR LAW 1900-1971, 290-300 (1972).
3 Hague Protocol, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955) [hereinafter, Hague Protocol].
As of December 31, 1975, 83 states were parties to the Hague Protocol. For
bibliography on Hague Protocol up to 1971, see HEERE, supra note 2, at 300-04.
4 Guatemala City Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971), [hereinafter Guatemala
City Protocol]. The protocol is not yet in force and, as of December 31, 1975,
had been ratified by only 2 states. For two articles describing the Protocol, see
FitzGerald, The Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention,
9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 217-51 (1971); and Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of
Guatemala City to Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. Am
L. & COM. 519 (1972). See also HEERE, supra note 2, at 306-07.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Convention of 1961V The four protocols adopted at Montreal all
but replaced the Poincar6 gold franc' as the unit of account in the
Warsaw system (whether in its original form or as amended) by
the Special Drawing Right7 of the International Monetary Fund.
Curiously enough, ICAO had not convened the conference for this
purpose, but rather for the specific and limited purpose of revising
the Warsaw/Hague provisions on the carriage of cargo and mail,
the revised provisions being found in Montreal Protocol No. 4.
The conference was attended by delegates from sixty-six states!
5 For the text of the Guadalajara Convention, see ICAO Doc. 8181 (1961)
[hereinafter Guadalajara Convention]. As of December 31, 1975, 50 states were
parties to the Convention.
"This is an artificial unit of account contained in the Warsaw Convention
and is described in Art. 22 of that Convention as " . . . the French franc consisting of 65 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900."
The Special Drawing Right is described and discussed under Heading VII
inf ra.
I The conference was attended by the following states: Algeria, Argentina,
Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chili, China, Cuba, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France,
German Democratic Republic, The Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, The
Republic of Korea, Mauritania, Morocco, The Kingdom of the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and
Republic of Zaire.
The conference did most of its work in the Commission of the Whole which
held thirty-one meetings. There were also thirteen plenary meetings of the conference, some of them being of relatively short duration. Decisions in the Commission of the Whole required only a simple majority of votes cast, while those
in plenary meetings required a two-thirds majority of votes cast. The minutes
of these meetings were not available at the time of writing, although summaries
of decisions were available as follows: W/H-CM-SRP/1-13 [Warsaw/HagueConference Montreal-Summary Record Plenary] and W/H-CM-SRC/1-31
(1975) [Warsaw/Hague-Conference Montreal-Summary Record: Commission
of the Whole]. Basic documents available to the conference were ICAO Doe.
9131-LC/173-2 (1975), the draft minutes of the 21st session of Legal Committee and the documents of the conference W/H-CM Doc. Nos. 1-77. The documents of the Conference have been included with their original reference number in ICAO Doe. 9154-LC/174-2 (1975). ICAO Doe. 9131-LC/173-2 contains
in pages 1-64, the Summary Report of the work of the Legal Committee during
its 21st session. At that session the Committee prepared draft revised articles
on documentation (Art. 5-16) and draft articles on liability (Art. A-2(2); B-18;
C-19 and 20; D-21; E-24 and F-30A). For convenience, when later in this article
there is a discussion of the liability provisions of the Montreal draft articles,
reference will be made to the numbered Articles rather than to the lettered ones;

1976]

THE FOUR MONTREAL PROTOCOLS

and observers from eight international organizations and had be-

fore it draft articles prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee at
Montreal in 1974. Earlier work on the cargo and mail provisions
had been carried out by an ICAO legal subcommittee in 1972"
and by the ICAO Legal Committee in 1974.1 All four protocols
were opened for signature at Montreal on September 25, 1975.12
The purpose of this article is to examine the development of
the four protocols adopted by the Montreal Conference with particular emphasis on the treatment of the Warsaw regime; ICAO
preparatory work during the period 1972-1974; documentation

relating to cargo; the system of liability in relation to cargo; air
mail; the unit of account-the shift from the Poincar6 gold franc
to the Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary Fund;
the form of the new instrument; avoidance of conflict between the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 (cargo provisions) and a possible Convention on the International Combined Transport of Cargo as well

as conventions on liability in respect to the carriage of nuclear
this, it is hoped, will help to focus reader's attention on the actual sequence of
the Warsaw articles which are, of course, numbered. Similarly, in the case of
the Protocols, except for articles in Final Clauses, reference will normally be
made to the Warsaw numbering in Arabic numbers rather than to the Protocol
numbering in Roman numerals.
The final sequence of the various sets of draft articles and draft protocols
placed before the conference is as follows:
Protocol
Text:
Text:
Final Clauses: Final Clauses:
Drafting
Commission
Committee
Commission
Committee
of the Whole
of the Whole
W/H-CM
W/H-CM
W/H-CM
W/H-CM
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
1
58
63
67
74
2
59
64
65
75
3
60
73
66
77
4
57
62
61
76
Addenda l&2
9International organizations represented at the conference were International
Air Carrier Association (IACA), International Air Transport Association
(IATA), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Federation
of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), International Law Association (ILA),
Office central des Transports internationaux par Chemins de Fer (OCTI) and
Universal Postal Union (UPU).
10For subcommittee report see, ICAO Doc. 913 1-LC/173-2 at 109-56 (1975).
" For report of Legal Committee, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 1-64
(1975).
12As of December 31, 1975, the protocols had been signed by relatively few
states: Protocol No. 1 by 12; Protocol No. 2 by 13; Protocol No. 3 by 11, and
Protocol No. 4 by 15.
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substances and final clauses. Some remarks will then be made by
way of conclusion.
As the conference is one of the most important during the long
and controversial history of the evolution of the Warsaw system,
this article contains a detailed presentation of the main proposals
made at the conference along with a summary of the discussions
at the preparatory ICAO Legal Committee meetings.
II. THE WARSAW REGIME
Briefly, the original Warsaw Convention of 1929 provides for
the presumed liability of the air carrier when, during international
carriage by air, a passenger is killed or injured or there is loss or
delay of, or damage to, cargo and baggage. The carrier may invoke
the defenses (i) that he and his agents had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures, " or (ii) that there was contributory
negligence of the victim."' The carrier's liability to passengers is
limited to 125,000 gold francs ($10,000 U.S.). The limitation for
checked baggage and cargo is 250 gold francs ($20 U.S.) per
kilogram. For any possessions which the passenger carries with
him, liability is restricted to 5,000 gold francs ($400 U.S.)."
Under specified circumstances the carrier may lose the benefit of
limited liability.
The Hague Protocol of 1955 doubled the passenger limit to
250,000 gold francs ($20,000 U.S.) and modified the circumstances under which a carrier would lose the protection of liability
limitations. It also simplified the provisions on documents of carriage, but retained the prior limits for baggage and cargo and for
any possessions carried by the passenger."
The Guatemala City Protocol of 1971, not yet in force, is intended to amend the Warsaw regime by subjecting the carriage of
13Warsaw Convention, Art. 20.

Id., Art. 21.
'5 Id., Art. 22(1), (2) and (3). The figures given in United States dollars are
approximate and are based on the hypothesis of gold having a value of $42.22
U.S. per troy ounce.
14However, while 83 states have become parties to the Hague Protocol, its
effect has been weakened due to non participation of the United States of America.
14
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passengers and baggage to the principle of absolute liability'
coupled, however, with the defense of contributory negligence of
the person claiming compensation.18 The Protocol provides for an
unbreakable limit of 1,500,000 gold francs ($120,000 U.S.)19 for
each passenger. The amendment further provides for diplomatic
conferences to be convened during the fifth year after the date of
entry into force of the Protocol, to decide whether to amend this
arrangement, and during the tenth year to decide whether it should
be continued." In addition, there is a provision for a "domestic
supplement," proposed by the United States, whereby states which
are parties to the Protocol would have the right to adopt supplemental systems to provide compensation to the victims of international aviation accidents in addition to any recoveries available
against the carrier within the liability limits recommended by the
ICAO Legal Committee. The carrier would be reimbursed for the
financial burden of the increase in liability."
The liability provided in the case of delay of passengers is established at 62,500 gold francs ($5,000 U.S.) and, in the case of the
carriage of checked baggage, liability for destruction, loss, damage
or delay is limited to 15,000 gold francs ($1,200 U.S.) per pas17Warsaw Convention Art. 17(1) as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol. Indeed, United States dissatisfaction with the outdated Warsaw-Hague provisions relating to the carriage of passengers had earlier brought about a de facto
amendment of those provisions. Thus, the Montreal Agreement of 1966 provides,
with respect to the carriage of passengers, that airlines whose flights touch United
States territory are subject to absolute liability with limited defenses and that
the limit of liability for each passenger (for death or personal injury) is $75,000,
inclusive of legal fees and costs, or, where appropriate, $58,000, exclusive of
legal fees and costs. The Montreal Agreement also requires that the passenger
be given a notice, in large type, concerning the limitation of liability. See CAB
Agreement 18900 (May 13, 1966).
18Warsaw Convention Art. 21 as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol.
"Warsaw Convention Art. 22 as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol.
"Warsaw Convention Art. 42, included in Art. XV of the Guatemala City
Protocol.
21 Warsaw Convention Art. 35A, included in Art. XIV of the Guatemala City
Protocol. This concept was put forward at the Guatemala City Conference (1971)
by the United States. Since that time United States authorities have been working
out a plan for the national supplement in consultation with insurance interests
and, at the time of writing, it was expected that the plan would shortly be submitted to the appropriate legislative bodies in the United States of America for
approval. According to the Supplemental Plan, an insurance company would provide compensation for proven damages in excess of the Guatemala City Protocol
limit per person.
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senger" These limits too are unbreakable. The Protocol eliminates
the former provisions for loss of limited liability for the carrier's
non-compliance with certain requirements concerning passenger
and baggage documentation or for the carrier's "wilful misconduct"
during carriage of passengers and baggage.' In addition, the
Guatemala Protocol, recognizing the high degree of automation
that is now available, provides that passenger tickets and baggage
checks may be replaced by any other means which would preserve
a record of the information concerning place of departure and
destination and agreed stopping places."
The Guadalajara Convention of 1961 supplements the Warsaw
regime by stipulating that the regime applies to international carriage by air performed by a person other than the contracting
carrier.
It may be recalled that during the Guatemala City Conference
certain delegations proposed that the conference not adopt a
protocol; rather, a new convention was proposed, which would contain the Warsaw provisions as amended by the Hague and Guatemala City Protocols. The remaining unamended provisions of the
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and the substantive provisions of the Guadalajara Convention would also have been included. This proposal was rejected.' Later in this article reference
will be made to a similar proposal made during the Montreal
Conference.
HI. ICAO

PREPARATORY WORK DURING THE PERIOD

1972-1975

The Montreal Conference was preceded by preparatory work at
the ICAO legal meetings. The ICAO Subcommittee on Revision
22

Warsaw Convention Art. 22 included in Art. VIII of the Guatemala City

Protocol.
2 Warsaw Convention Arts. 3 & 4 as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol:
failure to issue documents of carriage or defects in the documents of carriage
will not cause the carrier to lose the benefit of his limitation of liability; Warsaw
Convention Art. 25 as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol: the so-called
"wilful misconduct" of the carrier will cause the limits to be reached only in the
case of the carriage of cargo.
24Warsaw Convention Art. 3 as amended by the Guatemala City Protocol
concerning the document of carriage for passengers contemplates the use of electronic data processing (EDP) as a substitute for the ticket and provides for the
use of any other means which would preserve a record of specified information.
'See FitzGerald, supra note 4, at 245-47.
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of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as Amended by the Hague
Protocol of 1955: (a) Cargo; (b) Mail; and (c) Automatic Insurance, established by the 19th session of the ICAO Legal Committee
in May 1972," met in Montreal during the period of September 20October 4, 1972." The subcommittee noted that the reports of the
rapporteur on automatic insurance had been presented in 1968"
and 1969" as an aid to seeking a solution for a specific problem
relating to passenger carriage, but because of the later adoption of
the Guatemala City Protocol, the problem no longer existed. The
subcommittee recommended that no study of automatic insurance
be undertaken. As will be seen later, the subcommittee was unable to chose between a system of strict liability and presumed
liability in respect to cargo, and left it to the Legal Committee to
make the choice.
At its 21st Session, held in Montreal during October 3-22, 1974,
the Legal Committee took up the question of the revision of the
cargo and mail provisions of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as
amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955." The Committee considered such topics as documentation, principles of the system of
liability, air mail and the form of the new instrument. The Committee prepared draft articles which incorporated a system of strict
liability, and these were presented to the conference as the basis
for its work.
The Legal Committee was concerned about the potential conflict between the new instrument relating to cargo and the Guatemala City Protocol, which also reproduced some provisions of the
Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague Protocol, relating
to cargo. Later, the ICAO Council appointed a Working Group
to consider the matter and that body, which met from April 24-29,
1975, prepared a report which was placed before the conference."
" ICAO Doc. 9096-LC/171-2 (1974); the Subcommittee had earlier been

established at the 17th Session of the Legal Committee, but had not in fact met.
2"ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 109-56 (1975).
2"For the first report (1968) of the rapporteur in which the question of compulsory insurance is raised, see ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 at 95-103 (1975).
2" For the second report (1969) of the rapporteur on automatic compensation,
see ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 at 271-89 (1969).
"°ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 1-64 (1975).
"W/H-CM Doc. No. 10, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 74 (1975).
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The main elements of the reports of the bodies mentioned above
will be woven into the discussion below.

IV.

DOCUMENTATION RELATING TO CARGO

A. Introduction
The story of the modification of the Warsaw/Hague documentation provisions (Articles 5-16) as they passed through the subcommittee, the Legal Committee and the Montreal Conference is
that of a struggle between those who wished to simplify the provisions to adapt them to the introduction of electronic data processing (EDP) for air cargo and those who wished to retain the
relatively cumbersome documentation requirements. It is against
this background that the main changes in the documentation provisions will be examined.
Although there was general agreement in the subcommittee"
that the basic framework of the Warsaw Convention on the air
waybill should be retained, the main thrust of the discussion concerned the appropriateness of using electronic data processing
(EDP) for cargo in a provision similar to that contained in Article
3 (2) of the Guatemala City Protocol for passengers."
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) proposedr
deletion of Warsaw/Hague Articles 5-11 (which are concerned
with the air waybill) and Article 34 (which is concerned with
carriage performed in extraordinary circumstances) and the amendment of other articles to delete the reference to air waybills. Thus,
cargo documentation would no longer be regulated by the Warsaw
Convention, but left for regulation by commercial interests and
governments. IATA asserted that elimination of the documentation
requirements would effect economies which would be passed on to
the consumers with a result that more cargo would be carried by
air. In opposition to the IATA proposal, it was noted that if the
provisions on cargo documents were eliminated, uniformity of law
would not be promoted and there could be a regime of conflicting
1"ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 109-56 (1975).
" This approach was reflected in the Swedish proposal discussed below. See
ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 123-29 & 147-49 (1975).
34Id. at 17-53 & 124-25.
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national laws. The subcommittee did not accept the IATA3 ' proposal.
The subcommittee had before it a Swedish proposal 5 for certain
amendments to Articles 5-16 which would permit the use of EDP
for cargo handling and at the same time provide for the issuing of
a goods receipt. The proposed amendments permitted use of the
air waybill as before, but would also permit the use of modem
data processing systems as an alternative.
During discussion of the Swedish proposal the multi-purpose
role of the air waybill was emphasized: the air waybill was used
as a traffic document and contained an indication of the consignee
and destination; it was a rating document which recorded the freight
charges; it was an accounting document, which served as a financial
record between the parties to the contract; and, lastly, it was an
insurance document which enabled the parties to obtain insurance.
It was submitted that the only difference between the air waybill
and the goods receipt was that the Warsaw/Hague provisions required the waybill to indicate the places of departure and destination or a stopping place if the places of departure and destination
were in the territory of one state which was a party to the Convention, while the Swedish proposal did not require the inclusion of
such indications in the goods receipt. The above comments will be
of interest when an examination is made of later efforts, both in
the Legal Committee and the Montreal Conference, to incorporate
into the goods receipt the same indications as those in the air
waybill.
The subcommittee took the Swedish proposal as the basis for
future work, although it noted that many questions had been raised
for which it had found no answers. In the subcommittee's view the
great virtue of the Swedish proposal was that it permitted retention, in principle, of the present regime of documentation for the
carriage of cargo by air under the Warsaw Convention, while
opening the door to the introduction of a system of electronic data
recording. The subcommittee included the Swedish proposal in its
report and sent it to the Legal Committee together with a record
of comments made on the proposal.
The Swedish proposal was submitted to the Legal Committee
'ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 123-29 & 147-49 (1975).
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and much the same arguments in its favor were adduced by
Sweden, but then a note of caution was sounded. It was explained
that all rules relating to documentation could not be eliminated
from the revised instrument since automation and computerization
would be introduced only gradually on some air routes and in
some parts of the world, while on other routes and in other parts
of the world the old system of documentation might have to be
retained. Hence, the new instrument should provide for a coexistence of the new simplified system and the old system. The
Swedish proposal continued to provide for a goods receipt to be
delivered to the shipper; it was envisioned that the receipt could
be prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract and of
receipt of the cargo. "'
IATA pointed out to the Legal Committee that present air cargo
documentation was complicated and prohibitively expensive since
it accounted for over 50% of the total ground handling costs. Accordingly, TATA's preference was to eliminate from the Warsaw/
Hague system all reference to documentation; it believed that the
continued existence of the air waybill did not depend upon retention
of the Warsaw/Hague documentation provisions. Nevertheless, if
many delegations were not prepared to accept total elimination of
those provisions, IATA considered the proposal for the co-existence
of the new automated computer system and the old regime to be
an acceptable solution."
Among the points raised in the Legal Committee during the
discussion on documentation were the necessity for definition of
the contents of the goods receipt; the clarification of the evidentiary
value of the goods receipt; the necessity of having a flexible enough
system of documentation to encompass the present system of
documentation and the automated data processing system; the cost
implications of the introduction of the automated data processing
system for many countries; the necessity of having a simplified air
cargo document which would maintain the basic purpose of the
Warsaw Convention, unification of law, without sacrificing the
benefits flowing from the use of electronic equipment; the fact that
only a few airlines were at present prepared for an automated data
IId. at 18.
37 Id.
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processing system; the necessity of simplifying the IATA standard
form of air waybill; and the necessity of having the evidentiary
value of the goods receipt prevail over the electronic record in case
of discrepancy between the electronic record and the contents of
the goods receipt. Subsequently, the Legal Committee approved a
series of draft articles (hereinafter sometimes called The Montreal
draft)"s for submission to an international conference on air law
in accordance with the usual procedure."
B. Article 5-Delivery of the waybill and receipt for the cargoElectronic data processing and air cargo
Warsaw/Hague Article 5(1) provides that the carrier of cargo
has the right to require the consignor to prepare and deliver a
document called an air waybill and that every consignor has the
right to require the carrier to accept this document. In addition
Warsaw/Hague Article 5 (2) provides that the absence, irregularity
or loss of the air waybill does not affect the existence or the
validity of the contract of carriage which, subject to certain exceptions, is none the less governed by rules of the Convention.
All of the foregoing has been reduced to one sentence in Montreal
Protocol No. 4, Article 5(1), which reads: "In respect to the carriage of cargo an air waybill shall be delivered.""
Article 5(2) of Montreal Protocol No. 4, and Article 3 of the
Guatemala City Protocol, provide for the use of other means of
preserving the record of the carriage to be performed:
Any other means which would preserve a record of the carriage
to be performed may, with the consent of the consignor, be substituted for the delivery of an air waybill. If such other means are
used, the carrier shall, if so requested by the consignor, deliver to
the consignor a receipt for the cargo permitting identification of the
consignment and access to the information contained in the record
preserved by such other means.
For the sequence of articles in the Montreal draft, see note 8 supra.
a This procedure is set forth in ICAO Assembly Resolution A7-6 which is
concerned with the approval of final draft conventions prepared by the ICAO
Legal Committee. Resolution A7-6 provides for the ICAO Council, under specified circumstances, to convene an international conference on air law for the
approval of a convention. For the text of Resolution A7-6, see ICAO Doe.
7669-LC/139/2 at 3 (1974).
11 The same text is found in the Montreal draft placed before the Conference.
SO

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

This provision was thoroughly discussed at the Montreal Conference. Since it is the key provision concerning the use of EDP in
substitution for older procedures, it deserves careful examination."'
In the Commission of the Whole there was a French proposal
to delete the words "with the consent of the consignor" in the first
sentence." A second French proposal was to add the word
"Nevertheless" at the beginning of the second sentence of Article
5(2) of the Montreal draft and to replace the words "if so requested by the consignor" in the second sentence by "unless the
consignor has waived the right."' During the discussion the
Netherlands proposed that the words "with consent of the consignor" be replaced by "unless the consignor objects"" or "in the
absence of objection of the consignor," and that the words "if so
requested by the consignor" be deleted. This would have the
effect of making the delivery of a receipt for the cargo mandatory
when an air waybill was delivered." There was considerable opposition to the French proposal because it could have the effect of converting the receipt for the cargo into an air waybill, a problem
which recurred consistently throughout the discussion on documentation. It was pointed out that in certain countries the consignor is
required by law to ask for an air waybill; it could not be left up to
the carrier to decide whether or not there should be one. Moreover, if the words "if so permitted by the consignor" were used, a
new paper would be required, a waiver by the consignor.
The Netherlands also proposed to amend the second sentence in
Article 5(2) to read: "If such other means are used, the consignor
is entitled to a receipt for the cargo permitting identification of the
consignment."" It was submitted that the use of other means of preserving a record of the carriage to be performed, especially in the
case of EDP, should be conditioned upon the existence of the necessary facilities at all the airports involved in the carriage. Also the
receipt for the cargo would, as indicated later in Article 11, have

"' The Commission of the Whole considered Art. 5, on first reading, at its
first, third, fourth and fifth meetings.
"W/H-CM

Doc. No. 26, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 139 (1975).

3Id.

"Id.

"W/H-CM-SRC/1, 5 2 (1975).
W/H-CM Doc. No. 26, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 139 (1975).
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an important evidentiary role; hence there should be provisions
about the contents of the receipt just as there were with respect to
the contents of the air waybill.
In an attempt to meet some of the concerns that had been expressed, Canada proposed inclusion of the following substitution for
Article 5 (2):
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article,
where any other means that would preserve a record of the carriage to be performed are available to all parties, such means may
be substituted for the delivery of an air waybill. In such a case the
carrier shall, if requested, make available evidence of the preservation of the record of the said carriage by the other means, such as
a receipt for cargo."'
This proposal was withdrawn in favor of one by the United Kingdom to add "and access to the other means" after the words
"identification of the consignment" in Article 5(2)."' The main
thrust of the second sentence of the Canadian proposal, as reflected
in the United Kingdom proposal, was to ensure that the receipt
for the cargo would be a key to the information stored in the computer.
At the fourth meeting of the Commission of the Whole the
French and Netherlands proposals were both rejected and the
United Kingdom proposal was adopted. "' The ninth plenary meeting rejected a French proposal to replace the words "if so requested
by the consignor" in Article 5(2) with "unless waived by the
latter."5'
Article 5(3) reads: "The impossibility of using, at points of
transit and destination, the other means which would preserve the
record of the carriage referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article does
not entitle the carrier to refuse to accept the cargo for carriage."
This provision was adopted as a result of a Soviet Union proposalV'
to the third meeting of the Commission of the Whole that the
47

W/H-CM Doc. No. 29, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 144 (1975).
5 3 (1975).
4' These
votes took place at the fourth meeting of the Commission of the
Whole and, on first reading, Art. 5(2) as thus amended was approved by 46
votes in favor and none against, with 3 abstentions.
48W/H-CM-SRC/4,

5°W/H-CM-SRP/9, 5 6 (1975).

51 W/H-CM Doc. No. 26, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 140 (1975).
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carrier not be allowed to decline acceptance of the cargo on the
ground that the other means which preserve a record referred to
in Article 5(2) are not used at the place of destination. A Netherlands proposal to replace the words "authorized the carrier" in
Article 5(3) with "entitle the carrier" was approved at the ninth
plenary meeting."
C. Article 6-Description of air waybill
The form of the air waybill is dealt with in Article 6. The main
change in this provision has been the omission of Article 6(3) of
the Warsaw/Hague text which read: "The carrier shall sign prior
to the loading of the cargo on board the aircraft." This paragraph
had already been deleted by the Legal Committee." Article 6, as
included in Montreal Protocol No. 4, reads as follows:
1. The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor in three
original parts.
2. The first part shall be marked "for the carrier"; it shall be
signed by the consignor. The second part shall be marked "for the
consignee"; it shall be signed by the consignor and by the carrier.
The third part shall be signed by the carrier and handed by him to
the consignor after the cargo has been accepted.
3. The signature of the carrier and that of the consignor may be
printed or stamped.
4. If, at the request of the consignor, the carrier makes out the air
waybill, he shall be deemed, subject to proof to the contrary, to
have done so on behalf of the consignor.
D. Article 7-Documentation when there is more than one package
Article 7 in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads:
When there is more than one package:
a) the carrier of cargo has the right to require the consignor to
make out separate air waybills;
b) the consignor has the right to require the carrier to deliver
separate receipts when the other means referred to in paragraph 2
of Article 5 are used.
The only difference between this Article and the Warsaw/Hague
Article is its provision, in accordance with a Swiss proposal, " for
52

W/H-CM-SRP/9, 5 6 (1975).
" The vote was thirty-six in favor with none opposed and one abstention.

ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 30 (1975).
MW/H-CM Doc. No. 30, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 145 (1975).
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delivery of separate receipts for the cargo when there is more than
one package and the other means referred to in Article 5(2) are
used.
E. Article 8-Contents of air waybill and receipt for the cargo
Article 8 in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads:
The air waybill and the receipt for the cargo shall contain:
a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed
stopping places being within the territory of another State, an indication of at least one such stopping place; and
c) an indication of the weight of the consignment.
The new Article 8 differs from the Warsaw/Hague provision regarding the contents of documentation by including not only the
air waybill, but also the receipt for the cargo. Further, the new
Article also stipulates that both documents must contain an indication of the weight of the consignment. This change originated in
a French proposal," at the fifth and sixth meetings of the Commission of the Whole, which specified that a receipt should make it
possible to identify the consignment and should contain an indication of its weight and the places of departure and destination.
During the discussion in the sixth meeting of the Commission of
the Whole Tunisia and Belgium proposed the following text:
If the other means referred to in Article 5(2) is used, it shall
record at least the indications provided for in Article 8 as well as
an indication of the weight of the consignment. The said other
means shall ensure that these indications are preserved for a period
equal at least to the period prescribed in Article 29."
This proposal was not put to a vote. The French proposal was
adopted, resulting in a requirement that the cargo receipt, at least
for the purposes of the minimum contents specified by the Convention, should contain the same number of details as the air waybill.
1- The proposal was for the introduction of Art. 8 reading as follows:
"The receipt shall permit the identification of the consignment and indicate
the weight and the points of departure and destination." W/H-CM Doc. No. 31,
ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 146 (1975).
- W/H-CM-SRC/6, 2 (1975). See also W/H-CM Doc. No. 33, ICAO Doe.
9154-LC-174-2 at 148 (1975) which adds at the end of the above text: " . . .
when action against the carrier is allowable under the terms of Article 26."
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*Another important difference between the new Article 8 and the
Warsaw/Hague provision is the omission of the requirement that
the air waybill (and, for that matter, the receipt for the cargo)
should include the Warsaw/Hague notice concerning the possible
applicability of the Convention to cargo carriage. This deletion had
already been made by the Legal Committee when it recommended
adoption of the system of strict liability coupled with unbreakability
of the limit for cargo." Similar action on the notice on passenger
tickets had already been taken at the Guatemala City Conference
in 197l.'"
At the fifteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole Poland
explained that a large number of contracts for carriage were entered
into by shippers who were not familiar with the provisions of the
'Warsaw Convention and noted that, after the Commission's acceptance of a system of absolute liability, it seemed even more
important that consignors be given the notice required in Article
8 (c) as amended at the Hague." The Polish proposal to this effect
was rejected by a narrow vote."
The text of Article 8, as it emerged from the Commission of the
Whole, contained two paragraphs. As in the Warsaw/Hague text
paragraph (1) provided for the contents of the air waybill with
an indication of the places of departure and destination, and the
agreed stopping place in specified circumstances. The well-known
Warsaw/Hague notice provision was omitted. Paragraph (2) referring to the receipt of the cargo, incorporated by reference the
contents of paragraph (1) and also required that an indication of
the weight of the consignment be included in the receipt for the
cargo. At the ninth plenary meeting the Federal Republic of Germany, supported by the United Kingdom, proposed that an indication of consignment weight be made a requirement of the air way57ICAO
Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 23-24 (1975) (Legal Committee report);
id. at 126 (Subcommittee report which discussed the question of the omission of
the notice provision found in Warsaw Convention Art. 8(c)).
"The notice provision was eliminated from Art. 3 by the Legal Committee
at its Seventeenth Session when it was decided that the limit of liability for passengers would be unbreakable, and that consequently there should be no connection between the limit and any notice to passengers concerning limitation of liability. See ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 at 24 (1970).
"GW/H-CM-SRC/15, 5 7 (1975).
6024 to 22, with 3 abstentions.

19761

THE FOUR MONTREAL PROTOCOLS

bill as it was for the cargo receipt. By converting Article 8 into a
single paragraph requiring that both the air waybill and the receipt
for the cargo contain an indication of consignment weight,"' the intended simplification of the air waybill and the receipt for the cargo
was indirectly eroded.
F. Article 9-Elimination of penalty for lack of notice in documentation
Warsaw/Hague Article 9 provides that if, with the consent of
the carrier, cargo is loaded on board the aircraft without an air
waybill having been made out, or if the air waybill does not include
the notice required by Warsaw/Hague Article 8(c), the carrier
shall not be entitled to avail himself of the limit on cargo liability.
Since Montreal Protocol No. 4 omits the notice requirement from
Article 8 and the new system of strict liability is coupled with an
unbreakable limit, Article 9 no longer contains a penalty. It merely
states that: "Non-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5 to
8 shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of
carriage, which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this
Convention including those relating to limitation of labilty."
G. Article, 10-Responsibility in case of irregularity,incorrectness
or incompleteness of documentation or record preserved by other means
Warsaw/Hague Article 10(1) has been considerably amended.
It originally provided that: "The consignor is responsible for the
correctness of the particulars and statements relating to cargo which
he inserts in the air waybill." Article 10(1) in Montreal Protocol
No. 4 reads:
The consignor is responsible for the correctness of the particulars
and statements relating to the cargo inserted by him or on his behalf in the air waybill or furnished by him or on his behalf to the
carrier for insertion in the receipt for the cargo or for insertion in
the record preserved by the other means referred to in paragraph 2
of Article 5.
The amended provision includes a reference to the receipt for the
cargo. Also, the wording has been changed to include the particulars and statements relating to the cargo inserted by the consignor
41W/H-CM-SRP/9,

5 9 (1975).
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or on his behalf in the air waybill or furnished by him or on his
behalf to the carrier for insertion in the receipt for the cargo or for
insertion in the EDP record. In particular, the words "on his behalf"
reflect that, in reality, it is not always the consignor himself who
acts on particulars and statements; he may also act through an
agent. The consignor is now fully responsible for the correctness of
the particulars and statements.
During the presentation of Article 10(1), as prepared by the
Drafting Committee, to the twenty-fourth meeting of the Commission of the Whole,"2 the Chairman of the Drafting Committee explained that the words "or for insertion in the record preserved by
the other means referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5" had been
inserted to cover a point which the Drafting Committee thought
the Commission had overlooked when considering the Legal Committee's text. The United States said that if these words were to be
included, it would propose the insertion of the words "by him" after
"or" because, without that phrase, the new words might imply that
the carrier could, on behalf of the consignor, place information in
the record which the consignor would have no opportunity to examine. The United States believed it to be unfair that the consignor be held responsible for the correctness of such information.
The United States proposal was rejected."e The words to which the
Chairman of the Drafting Committee had referred were also the
subject of a close vote but were approved.' The Commission also
approved the Drafting Committee's text of Article 10(1)."'
When the text of the Commission of the Whole emerged in the
ninth plenary meeting, Egypt, seconded by the United States, proposed the deletion from Article 10(1) of the words "for insertion
in the record preserved by the other means referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5,"" to be consistent with Article 11, under
which only the air waybill or the receipt for the cargo, and not the
EDP record, was prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the
5 11 (1975).
The rejection was by a very small vote of six in favor and nine opposed,
with eight abstentions.
'4 By a vote of twenty-two to seventeen, with five abstentions.
62W/H-CM-SRC/24,
63

6By a vote of thirty-eight to three, with seven abstentions.
-W/H-CM-SRP/9,

5 11 (1975).
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contract, acceptance of the cargo and the conditions of the carriage. This proposal was rejected."'
The new Article 10(2) reads: "The consignor shall indemnify
the carrier against all damage suffered by him, or by any other
person to whom the carrier is liable, by reason of the irregularity,
incorrectness or incompleteness of the particulars and statements
furnished by the consignor or on his behalf."
Warsaw/Hague Article 10(2) has been only slightly amended:
the words "or on his behalf" have been added at the end of the provision. This'addition lines up Article 10(2) with Article 10(1).
A Brazilian proposal to restrict the scope of Article 10(2) by adding the words "and inserted in the air waybill" at the end of the
paragraphs8 was rejected by the Commission of the Whole at its
twenty-fifth meeting."'
Article 10(3) in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the
carrier shall indemnify the consignor against all damage suffered
by him, or by any other person to whom the consignor is liable,
by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of
the particulars and statements inserted by the carrier or on his
behalf in the receipt for the cargo or in the record preserved by the
other means referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5.
This provision resulted from a proposal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, seconded by the Soviet Union,"' to add a paragraph requiring the carrier to indemnify the consignor against all
damage suffered by him, or by any person to whom the consignor
is liable, by reason of the irregularity of the receipt for the cargo
delivered by the carrier. This paragraph brought a new element to
Article 10 because it was intended to deal with particulars and
statements furnished by the carrier, not those furnished by the consignor. The Commission of the Whole approved the proposal at its
seventh meeting. As reported by the Drafting Committee to the
twenty-fifth meeting of the Commission of the Whole, the text of
Article 10(3) read:
0

0

By a vote of sixteen to nine with seven abstentions.

a W/H-CM-SRC/25, 5 2 (1975).
69By a vote of twenty-six to four, with six abstentions.
70
W/H-CM-SRC/7, 5 4 (1975).
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The carrier shall indemnify the consignor against all damage suffered by him, or by any other person to whom the consignor is
liable, by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness and incompleteness of the particulars and statements inserted by the carrier 1 or
on his behalf in the receipt for the cargo.
In this meeting of the Commission of the Whole the words "Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article," were
inserted at the beginning of Article 10(3)." Also, the Commission
adopted a Brazilian proposal to add at the end of Article 10(3)
the words "or in the record preserved by the other means referred
to in paragraph (2) of Article 5. '' "3This later addition gave a
great measure of protection to the consignor, who could be exposed
to damage (as described in Article 10(3)) by the carrier or on
the carrier's behalf by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness or
incompleteness of the particulars.
H. Article i-Evidentiary value of air waybill or receipt for the
cargo
Article 11 (1) in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads as follows: "The
air waybill or the receipt for the cargo is prima facie evidence
of the conclusion of the contract, of the acceptance of the cargo
and of the conditions of carriage mentioned therein."
The only difference between the Warsaw/Hague Article 11 ( 1)
and the new provision is the insertion of the reference to the receipt
for the cargo. There was, however, difficulty concerning this provision during the seventh and eighth meetings of the Commission of
the Whole. Initially, Australia proposed to include after "receipt for
the cargo" the words "or the other means contemplated by Article
5, paragraph (2)."" The proposal was intended to cover the case
in which there was neither an air waybill, nor a receipt for the
cargo because EDP had been used and the consignor had waived
his right to a receipt for the cargo. Australia accepted a Brazilian
amendment which would have inserted after "receipt for the
cargo" the words "or in the absence of the receipt, the other means
11W/H-CM. Doc. No. 57 at 4, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 186 (1975).
7
2 W/H-CM-SRC/25,
2 (1975).
73 Id.

" For a discussion of evidentiary issues arising out of computerized records,
see Freed, Mock Trial-Admissibility of Computerized Business Records, 15
JURIMETRICS J. 206-46 (1975).
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contemplated by Article 5, paragraph (2)."" France then proposed
to add a sentence to the effect that the other means would only be
prima facie evidence against the carrier." The Australian, Brazilian
and French proposals were withdrawn in favor of a Norwegian proposal to insert the following new sentence in Article 11 (1): "In
the absence of an air waybill and a receipt for the cargo the same
applies to the record referred to in Article 5(2) if such record is
invoked by a party who is not keeping the record."'
The proposal was defeated" and Article 11 ( 1 ) was accepted by
the Commission of the Whole in its present form.
The new Article 11 (2) reads:
Any statements in the air waybill or the receipt for the cargo
relating to the weight, dimensions and packing of the cargo, as well
as those relating to the number of packages, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated; those relating to the quantity, volume
and condition of the cargo do not constitute evidence against the
carrier except so far as they both have been, and are stated in the
air waybill to have been, checked by him in the presence of the
consignor, or relate to the apparent condition of the cargo.
While a reference to the receipt for the cargo has been included in
the first part of Article 11 (2) a Brazilian proposal" to include a
reference to the receipt for the cargo following the words "air waybill" in the second part of Article 11 (2) was defeated during the
eighth meeting of the Commission of the Whole."0
At the same meeting, Sweden proposed,"' and the United States
seconded, the addition of a second sentence to Article 11 (2):
"The receipt for the cargo shall be prima facie evidence of the
weight of the cargo." After the Commission had voted on the
Brazilian proposal, the Swedish proposal was withdrawn.
At the ninth plenary meeting, Norway and the United Kingdom
stated that they had voted in favor of Article 11 (2) on the understanding that the exception in the last part would apply not
- W/H-CM-SRC/7, 5 6 (1975).
r6Id.
7
7 W/H-CM-SRC 18, 5 1 (1975).
,By a vote of thirty-three to seven with twelve abstentions.
rW/H-CM-SRC/8, 5 2 (1975).
"By a vote of twenty-two to seventeen, with nine abstentions.
"W/H-CM-SRC/8, 5 2 (1975).
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only when the facts had been checked by the carrier and consignor personally, but also when they had been checked by a person acting on behalf of the carrier and consignor. In other words,
checking by the carrier's servants or agents would satisfy the requirement inherent in the words "checked by him" in Article 11 (2).
I. Article 12-Right of disposal of cargo
The new text of Article 12 reads:
1. Subject to his liability to carry out all his obligations under
the contract of carriage, the consignor has the right to dispose of
the cargo by withdrawing it at the airport of departure or destination, or by stopping it in the course of the journey on any landing,
or by calling for it to be delivered at the place of destination or in
the course of the journey to a person other than the consignee
originally designated, or by requiring it to be returned to the airport of departure. He must not exercise this right of disposition in
such a way as to prejudice the carrier or other consignors and he
must repay any expenses occasioned by the exercise of this right.
2. If it is impossible to carry out the orders of the consignor the
carrier must so inform him forthwith.
3. If the carrier obeys the orders of the consignor for the disposition of the cargo without requiring the production of the part of
the air waybill or the receipt for the cargo delivered to the latter,
he will be liable, without prejudice to his right of recovery from the
consignor, for any damage which may be caused thereby to any
person who is lawfully in possession of that part of the air waybill
or the receipt for the cargo.
4. The right conferred on the consignor ceases at the moment
when that of the consignee begins in accordance with Article 13.
Nevertheless, if the consignee declines to accept the cargo, or if
he cannot be communicated with, the consignor resumes his right
of disposition.
The words "to a person other than the consignee named in the air
waybill" in Article 12(1) of the Warsaw/Hague text have been
replaced by "to a person other than the consignee originally designated." This change reflects the possibility, already inherent in
Article 5(2), that if EDP is used for the movement of cargo, no
documentation may be issued and the consignee may be "designated" in the computer only.
The Commission of the Whole referred two suggestions to the
Drafting Committee: (1) Nigeria: In Article 12(3), delete the
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phrase "he Will be liable" and insert it immediately preceding the
words "for any damage";8 (2) Norway: Rephrase the first sentence of Article 12(4) to read: "The right conferred on the consignor ceases at the moment when the consignee exercises his
right in accordance with Article." and delete the word "Nevertheless" at the beginning of the second sentence.' None of these
changes were made. Thus, Article 12 of the Warsaw/Hague text
survived with minor changes to paragraphs 1 and 2.
J. Article 13-Delivery of the cargo
Article 13 in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads as follows:
1. Except when the consignor has exercised his right under Article
12, the consignee is entitled, on arrival of the cargo at the place
of destination, to require the carrier to deliver the cargo to him,
on payment of the charges due and on complying with the conditions of carriage.
2. Unless it is otherwise agreed, it is the duty of the carrier to give
notice to the consignee as soon as the cargo arrives.
3. If the carrier admits the loss of the cargo, or if the cargo has
not arrived at the expiration of seven days after the date on which
it ought to have arrived, the consignee is entitled to enforce against
the carrier the rights which flow from the contract of carriage.
Article 13(1) of the Warsaw/Hague text has been amended
to delete reference to the air waybill. Since there may be no documentation issued where EDP is used for the carriage of cargo, no
reference to its being handed over at the point of delivery or embodying the conditions of carriage was deemed necessary.
There are no other substantive changes in Article 13. During
the ninth and tenth meetings of the Commission of the Whole,
however, there was a lengthy discussion of a Polish proposal to
introduce in Article 13 the following new paragraph:
Upon request by the consignee, the carrier shall, at the place of
destination, hand over to him a copy of an air waybill. If other
means which preserve a record referred to in Article 5(2) are
used, the consignee is entitled to request the carrier to provide him
with a copy of the receipt containing the particulars mentioned in
82W/H-CM-SRC/8, 5 10 (1975).
93Id. 5 12.
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Article 8 (bis) and permitting access to the other means which
preserve a record."'
"Article 8(bis)" should now be read as referring to "Article 8" in
its new form.
The argument given in support of the proposal was that the
consignee may, under some legal systems, have certain obligations imposed on him and, therefore, there should be some method
of informing him of the contract of carriage if EDP had been used
and no receipt for the cargo had been issued to the consignor.
Unlike the consignor, the consignee would not know what contractual data had been included in the computer. The proposal
was objected to as contrary to the philosophy of the convention,
since a computer print-out would not be available in multiple copies.
Also, the Polish proposal reopened debate on Article 6, which concerned the air waybill. Poland explained that in the original Warsaw Convention there had been a reference to the right of the consignee to the air waybill. Hence, the consignee should be entitled
to ask for a receipt for the cargo even if the consignor had not
asked for it. The consignee should be given information which
would enable him to take action against the carrier. In Article
30(3) of the Convention there was reference to an action being
brought against the last carrier in the case of successive carriers.
The view was expressed that the first sentence of the Polish proposal
was unnecessary since there was no longer a need for the air waybill to travel with the cargo and that, in any event, Article 13(2)
obliged the carrier to give notice to the consignee as soon as the
consignment arrived. It was also submitted that the second sentence of the Polish proposal was totally unnecessary in the context
of the totally computerized system to which the consignee would
be linked. Moreover, it was asserted that the contemplated access
should not be to "the other means" but to the "record."
At this stage a compromise suggestion was put forward by the
United States to the effect that the consignee would be entitled to
request the carrier to provide him with a "document" containing
the particulars mentioned in Article 8 in the event that an air
waybill is issued or, if "the other means" which preserve a record
"'W/H-CM Doc. No. 34, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 149 (1975); W/H
CM-SRC/9, 5 1 (1975); W/H-CM-SRC/10, 5 2 (1975).

19761

THE FOUR MONTREAL PROTOCOLS

are used, a "document" containing the particulars in Article 8 and
permitting access to the record which is preserved by the other
means. But Poland did not like the United States suggestion because the consignee always had the chance to obtain the air waybill if one were issued. Moreover, the use of the word "document"
in case EDP were used was inappropriate since a "document" did
not constitute prima facie evidence as did the receipt for the cargo.
The United States' suggestion was eventually withdrawn. The Polish
proposal was rejected.' A proposal of Cameroon"' to extend the
time limit in Article 13(3) to 15 days was withdrawn after a brief
discussion during the ninth meeting of the Commission of the
Whole.
K. Article 14-Enforcement of rights of consignor and consignee
The Warsaw/Hague text of Article 14 remains unchanged in
Montreal Protocol No. 4 which reads: The consignor and the consignee can respectively enforce all the rights given them by Articles
12 and 13, each in his own name, whether he is acting in his own
interest or in the interest of another, provided that he carries out
the obligations imposed by the contract of carriage.
L. Article 15-Relations of consignor and consignee or mutual
relations of third parties-Negotiableair waybill
Article 15 in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads:
1. Articles 12, 13 and 14 do not affect either the relations of the
consignor and the consignee with each other or the mutual relations
of third parties whose rights are derived either from the consignor
or from the consignee.
2. The provisions of Articles 12, 13 and 14 can only be varied by
express provision in the air waybill or the receipt for the cargo.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 15 of the Warsaw/Hague text remain substantially unchanged in Montreal Protocol No. 4. During
the ninth meeting of the Commission of the Whole, however, there
was a lengthy discussion whether Article 15(3), which had been
inserted in the Hague Protocol, should be retained. The Article
dealt with the question of negotiability in a somewhat passive way.
"Nothing in this Convention prevents the issue of a negotiable air
" By a vote of thirty-two to eighteen, with two abstentions.
'SW/H-CM Doc. No. 13 at 2; ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 104 (1975).
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waybill."8 The debate revolved around a Swiss proposal to provide
that Article 15 (3) be amended to read: "Nothing in this Convention prevents the issue of a negotiable air waybill or goods receipt."88
When introducing this proposal, Switzerland noted that Article
12(3), as adopted by the Commission of the Whole, made no
distinction between the air waybill and the receipt for the cargo.
There should be no difference between the two documents. Moreover, the receipt for the cargo might play an important banking
role in the future. Three broad positions were advanced during the
ensuing discussion: (a) Adoption of the Swiss proposal in order
to preserve the possibility of a negotiable receipt for the cargo as
an aid to trade; (b) Rejection of the Swiss proposal because there
was a danger of elevating the receipt for the cargo to the status of
an air waybill (recalling that the receipt for the cargo should perform a significantly different function from that of the air waybill); and (c) Elimination of Article 15(3) since the question of
the negotiability of cargo documents should be settled by national
law.
There were two votes on the Swiss proposal. The first vote was
22 in favour and 22 against with 5 abstentions. On the second vote,
the proposal was lost by 23 in favour and 29 against with 5 abstentions. When Article 15 (3) in its original Hague form was put to
vote, it failed, receiving 17 votes in favour and 22 against, with 14
abstentions.
At the ninth plenary meeting Article 15(1) was adopted, but
the word "or" before "the consignor" was replaced by "and." No
further change was made in the Article.
M. Article 16-Formalitiesof customs, octroi or police
Article 16 in Montreal Protocol No. 4 reads:
1. The consignor must furnish such information and such documents as are necessary to meet the formalities of customs, octroi
or police before the cargo can be delivered to the consignee. The
17 An ICAO Subcommittee on the negotiability of the Air Waybill met at
Madrid in April 1955, a few months prior to the Hague Conference, and concluded that the proposed instrument to amend the Warsaw Convention should
merely contain a statement that the Convention should not be read to prohibit
the issuance of negotiable air waybills. For report of the subcommittee, see ICAO

Doc. 7686-LC/140 at 106-14 (1956).
88W/H-CM Doc. No. 30, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 145 (1975).
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consignor is liable to the carrier for any damage occasioned by the
absence, insufficiency or irregularity of any such information or
documents, unless the damage is due to the fault of the carrier,
his servants or agents.
2. The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into the correctness
or sufficiency of such information or documents.
Since the use of EDP could preclude the issuance of documentation to which information and documents could be attached, the
new text of Article 16 omits the requirement that information and
documents be attached to the air waybill. Further changes suggested
to Article 16 were rejected.
When the Drafting Committee's text was under examination at
the twenty-fifth meeting of the Commission of the Whole, New
Zealand proposed replacement of Article 16(1) with the following modernized text found in a footnote to the Drafting Committee's report: "The consignor must furnish such information and
such documents required in connection with the entry, exit or transhipment of the cargo before the cargo can be delivered to the
consignee."89
Norway was prepared to support this text with the insertion
of the words "as are necessary to meet the formalities" after the
words "such documents." However, the New Zealand proposal
was rejected," and the Commission adopted the original text of
Article 16(1).
At the ninth plenary meeting, Cameroon, seconded by France,
proposed deletion of the word "octroi" 1 in the first sentence of
Article 16(1), no doubt on the ground that the word was out of
date and had no place in a modem convention. The proposal was
rejected by a vote of 9 to 8 with 6 abstentions. The plenary meeting then adopted a Kenyan proposal to insert a comma instead of
the word "or" after "carrier" in the second sentence of Article
16(1).
89

W/H-CM Doc. No. 57 at 6, ICAO Doc. 9154 LC-174-2 at 188 (1975).
o By a vote of seventeen to sixteen, with eight abstentions.
91The word "octroi" is an anachronism in that its dictionary meaning is a duty
levied in some continental countries on goods entering town. 1 THE COMPACT
EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

1973 (1971).
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V. SYSTEM OF LIABILITY IN RELATION TO CARGO

A. Introduction-Principlesof the system of liability
At the outset of ICAO work on the system of liability applicable
to cargo, there were conflicting opinions as to whether the revised
cargo provisions should provide for a system of strict liability," as
had been put forward to ICAO by IATA,"3 or whether they should
preserve the existing system based on a rebuttable presumption of
carrier fault. According to IATA, the system of strict liability
would guarantee a speedy and easy method of settlement which
would lead to a substantial reduction of insurance costs and consequent savings for the consignor. Accordingly, the subcommittee
considered revision of the cargo provisions on the basis of two
hypotheses: a system of strict liability and a system of subjective
liability, although the latter system was given relatively little
attention.
At the beginning of its twenty-first session the Legal Committee
considered two concepts of liability: one favoring the system of
strict liability with a limited number of defenses and with an unbreakable limit, and the opposing view favoring retention of the
Warsaw/Hague system of a rebuttable presumption of fault. The
Committee agreed that the final selection of the system would
depend on the number of defenses available to the carrier under
strict liability and also on a decision whether the limit would be
breakable or unbreakable.' After examining these matters the Committee decided, by a vote of 25 against 10 with 4 abstentions, in
favor of a system of strict liability in the case of loss or damage
92In the subcommittee, there was a discussion of the terminology to be used
for the IATA proposal that the liability of the carrier in respect of cargo not be
based on fault, and it was decided to use the term "strict liability" rather than
"absolute liability." ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 110 (1975).
" The TATA submission is found in LC/SC Warsaw (1972) WD/7 and is
described in the report of the subcommittee. ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at I1I
(1975). IATA returned to the question of liability for cargo at the Twenty-first

Session of the Legal Committee, and again pressed for strict liability except in
the case of delay. In the latter regard, IATA argued that liability for delay could
not be treated in the same way as liability for loss of or damage to goods, because a main cause of delay is adherence to safety requirements, in particular,
observance of weather minima, maintenance schedules and crew rest provisions.
It considered that, in this context, strict liability for delay would be inappropriate
and indeed harmful. ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 213 (1975).
" Id. at 20.
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to cargo.' The Committee retained the present Warsaw/Hague
system in the case of delay to cargo."
There were conflicting positions at the eleventh meeting of the
Commission of the Whole concerning the adoption of the principle
of strict liability. In particular, those opposed to the principle found
little difference between the concept of strict liability, as spelled out
in the Montreal draft, along with its accompanying defenses, and
the concept of presumed liability found in the existing Warsaw/
Hague cargo provisions. It was also argued that since all of the
existing transport conventions were based on the concept of carrier fault, providing for strict liability only for the air carriers
could seriously inconvenience the preparation of a convention on
the multimodal carriage of cargo" since there would be no unified
liability regime. Moreover, strict liability would not speed up the
settlement of claims, since they were generally settled by the claims
departments of the airlines. The opponents argued that fault liability
did not constitute an excessive burden for airlines, while strict
liability with the defenses now stipulated could lead to increased
insurance costs and give rise to prolonged litigation.
IATA noted that conference was considering a package consisting of three elements: (1) strict liability; (2) an unbreakable
limit on liability; and (3) detachment of the cargo documents
from their relationship to the limits of liability or removal of penalty
for lack of notice." If the concept of strict liability were not adopt'Id. at 25.
9"Id. at 26.

" This convention has been under study for many years successively in the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Intergovernmental Maritime

Consultative Organization (IMCO) (the last two having had an active joint committee which met in 1970-1971 and prepared a draft Convention on the International Combined Transport of Goods, known as the TCM Convention). How-

ever, a conference convened in November-December 1972 did not adopt the convention. Later, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) took up the task of preparing a multimodal convention, and studies
are currently under way in the Intergovernmental Preparatory Group on International Intermodal Transport (IPG) which, meeting under the auspices of
UNCTAD, has held three sessions, the third one in February-March 1976. See,
FitzGerald, Proposed Convention on the International Combined Transport of
Goods: Implications for International Civil Aviation, 11 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 166
(1973); Mankabady, Some Legal Aspects of the Carriageof Goods by Container,
23 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 317 (1974).
"The removal of the penalty for lack of notice was to be accomplished by

elimination of the requirement found in Warsaw Convention Art. 8(c) that the
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ed, the other parts of the package might fail. IATA did not agree
that the defenses stipulated in the Montreal draft were untried,
since courts were already familiar with common-law defenses. The
carriers believed that costs would be reduced with strict liability
and also hoped that the method would expedite the handling of
claims. An important indicative vote was taken at the eleventh
meeting of the Commission of the Whole and 35 states favored
the new system of strict liability based on the Montreal draft, while
19 states favored retention of the concept of presumed liability
described in Articles 18(1) and 20 of the Warsaw/Hague text.
Nevertheless, the subcommittee, the Legal Committee and conference all decided that the system of rebuttable presumption of
carrier fault should apply in the case of delay of cargo. The question of delay will be examined in more detail below.
B. Article 18(1) and (2)-StrictLiability
The basic statement of the strict liability of the carrier in the
carriage of cargo was achieved by deleting the reference to cargo
in Warsaw/Hague Article 18(1) and inserting a new Article
18 (2) in Montreal Protocol No. 4. The new provisions read:
1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered baggage, if
the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place
during the carriage by air.
2. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo upon condition only
that the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took
place during the carriage by air."
Article 18(2) was discussed at the conference as Article 18(1)
of the Legal Committee's draft. The provision survived a Swedish
proposal to replace the key words "upon condition only that" by
the word "if" and was adopted without change.
C. Defenses
1. General provisions (Article 18(3))
Article 18(2) of the Legal Committee's draft (renumbered in
consignor be given notice of the possible application of the Warsaw limit to the
carriage of the cargo and the amendment of Art. 9, to eliminate the penalty
for lack of such notice.
99W/H-CM-SRC/12, 5 1 (1975).
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Montreal Protocol No. 4 as Article 18 (3)) gave rise to a lengthy
discussion on many points."o The Legal Committee's draft read:
(2) However, the carrier is not liable if he proves that the destruction, loss of, or damage to, the cargo resulted solely from one
or more of the following:
(a) inherent defect, quality or vice of that cargo;
(b) defective packing of that cargo performed by a person
other than the carrier or his servants or agents;
(c) an act of war, an armed conflict, or civil disturbance;
(d) an act of public authority carried out in connection with
the entry, exit or transhipment of the cargo.
The carrier may not avail himself of the exoneration of liability
mentioned in this paragraph if the person claiming compensation
proves that there was negligence on the part of the carrier, his
servants or agents, and such negligence caused or contributed to
the destruction, loss or damage of the cargo.'
The initial discussion at the twelfth meeting of the Commission of
the Whole concerned the introductory part of the first subparagraph in Article 18 (2). A Norwegian proposal read: "The carrier
shall, however, be exonerated from liability if he proves that the
cause, occurrence and extent of the damage were beyond his
[fault and] control and that of any person for whom he is responsible and that the damage was [solely and directly] caused by one or
more of the following:""'
In addition, the Netherlands proposed to delete the word "solely"
from the introductory portion."
India proposed that the introductory portion read: "However,
the carrier is not liable if he proves that the destruction or loss of,
or damage to, the cargo resulted not from negligence on the part of
the carrier, his servants or agents, but solely from one or more of
the following: . . .""' and that the second subparagraph be deleted.
Norway indicated that it could second that proposal provided the
100For a summary of the discussions on defenses in the Subcommittee and
Legal Committee, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 114-17 (subcommittee) and
20-23 (Legal Committee) (1975).
1o W/H-CM Doc. No. 4, at 6, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 18 (1975).
102W/H-CM Doc. No. 28, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 143 (1975).
"'3W/H-CM Doc. No. 28, at 1, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 143 (1975).
'"W/H-CM-SRC 12, 5 3 (1975).
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word "negligence" was replaced by "fault" and the word "solely"
by "directly."
A Swedish amendment to the second subparagraph of Article
18(2) stated: "Nevertheless, the carrier shall be wholly or partly
liable to the extent that it is proved by the person claiming compensation that negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents caused or contributed to the destruction, loss or damage of
the cargo."
The proposal was intended to weaken the Legal Committee's text
which would totally deprive the carrier of the defenses in the
first paragraph of Article 18(2) even if the person claiming compensation proved mere contributory negligence on the part of the
carrier.
None of the foregoing proposals was adopted, although the
Netherlands proposal, calling for the deletion of the word "solely"
from the introductory part of the paragraph was rejected by a
close vote." The last part of the paragraph was approved.
The Drafting Committee's text, discussed by the tenth plenary
meeting, contained the old Article 18(2) renumbered as Article
18(3). After further discussion in the plenary session, the second
part of Article 18(3), the subparagraph following the list of
defenses which had been so much discussed in the Commission
of the Whole, was deleted.'"
2. Special suggestion of the InternationalFederation of Airline
Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)
At its eleventh and fourteenth meetings the Commission of the
Whole had before it a suggestion of the IFALPA Observer to add
to the second sentence of Article 18(2) of the Montreal draft the
words: "That the carrier, his servants or agents, having been informed of the contents of the consignment, failed to ensure that the
stowing of the cargo was performed adequately for the purpose
of transportation by air or in accordance with the applicable regulations for transportation of cargo by air.'"' The suggestion was
101By a vote of twenty-five to twenty-three, with 1 abstention.
101By a vote of nineteen to fourteen.
07
1
W/H-CM Doc. No. 6, Addendum, at 1, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 66
(1975); W/H-CM-SRC/1, 5 3 (1975).
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supported for purposes of discussion by Canada, Trinidad, and
Tobago.
After some opposing statements had been made, Canada, with
the consent of Trinidad and Tobago, withdrew the proposal, expressing the hope and belief that a more effective solution for the
problem of carriage of dangerous goods would be found in ICAO
bodies where technical matters were discussed. The whole of Article
18(2), later renumbered as Article 18(3), was then approved by
the Commission of the Whole.
3.

Article 18(3)-List of defenses
Discussion of the detailed list of defenses available to the carrier
under the system of strict liability followed much the same pattern
in the subcommittee, Legal Committee and conference.
The subcommittee accepted the defenses of inherent defect,
quality or vice of the cargo; defective packing of the cargo (although it believed that this latter defense could be subsumed under
the former); riots, acts of war and civil commotion; and damage
resulting from official or judicial actions. The subcommittee rejected the defenses of acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft; acts of
unlawful interference with international civil aviation; force majeure and grave natural disaster of an exceptional character; and
strikes and lockouts. The Committee accepted substantially the
same defenses as those put forward by the subcommittee with differences in wording in some cases.
At its thirteenth meeting,"°' the Commission of the Whole considered the defenses available to the carrier listed in subparagraphs
(a)-(d) of Article 18(2) as accepted by the subcommittee. A
Netherlands proposal to replace the English text of item (a) by
the words "nature or inherent defect of that cargo" was not supported and an Israeli suggestion that "nature" should be inserted
after "defect" was referred to the Drafting Committee. Item (a)
was then approved.
Item (b) was approved without change after the Commission
had rejected a Portuguese proposal for addition of the words "or
inappropriate" after the word "defective."
Item (c) gave rise to four proposals for amendment:
'8See

W/H-CM-SRC/13 (1975) for the various proposals on defenses.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

(1) To replace the Montreal text by the words "an act of war
or an act of armed conflict, whether of an internal or international character" (Egypt);
(2) Replacement of the Montreal text by the words "an act of
armed conflict, whether or not of an international character"
(France);
(3) To replace the Montreal text by "armed conflict, hostilities,
civil war or insurrection" (Netherlands);
(4) The deletion of item (c) (Israel).
The first two proposals failed; the last two were not seconded. The
Montreal text was adopted. Subparagraph (d) was approved without change.
As in the case of the subcommittee and Legal Committee the
thirteen meeting of the Commission of the Whole of the conference witnessed rejection of proposals by the Soviet Union to add
the two further defenses of grave natural disaster and acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
The defenses listed in items (a), (b) and (d) survived the voting in the tenth plenary meeting, but the defense of "civil disturbance," found in item (c) along with the defenses of "act of war"
and "armed conflict," was deleted." The deletion resulted from
the provision's failure to gain the two-thirds vote required by the
conference rules of procedure.
Accordingly, the text of Article 18(3) as adopted by the Conference reads:
However, the carrier is not liable if he proves that the destruction,
loss of, or damage to, the cargo resulted solely from one or more
of the following:
a) inherent defect, quality or vice of that cargo;
b) defective packing of that cargo performed by a person other
than the carrier or his servants or agents;
c) an act of war or an armed conflict;
d) an act of public authority carried out in connexion with the
entry, exit or transit of the cargo.
4. Article 21-Contributory negligence
The subcommittee retained the defenses of contributory negligence in Article 21 but expanded its availability to include not
only the contributory negligence of the person claiming compen109 By a vote of twenty-five to twenty, with four abstentions.
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sation, but also that of the consignor or consignee. The Legal Committee decided that the defense of contributory negligence should
be framed in terms of the negligence or other wrongful act or
omission of the claimant or the person from whom the claimant
derives his rights."' The Conference adopted the following text
of Article 2 1:
1. In the carriage of passengers and baggage, if the carrier proves
that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence
of the person suffering the damage the Court may, in accordance
with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or
partly from his liability.
2. In the carriage of cargo, if the carrier proves that the damage
was caused by or contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful
act or omission of the person claiming compensation, or the person
from whom he derives his rights, the carrier shall be wholly or
partly exonerated from his liability to the claimant to the extent
that such negligence or wrongful act or omission caused or contributed to the damage.
D. Article 18(4) and (5)-Meaning of "carriage by air"
Article 18(3) and (4), later renumbered as Article 18(4) and
(5), in the Montreal draft were adopted without change:
4. The carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding
paragraphs of this Article comprises the period during which the
baggage or cargo is in the charge of the carrier, whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside
an airport, in any place whatsoever.
5. The period of the carriage by air does not extend to any carriage
by land, by sea or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such carriage takes place in the performance of a contract
for carriage by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during
the carriage by air.
E. Article 22-Limit of liability
1. Principles for determination of the limit
During the subcommittee's discussion of this point it was indicated that the necessity of change should be established before a
I For a summary of the discussions on contributory negligence in the suncommittee and Legal Committee, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 117 (subcommittee) and 23 (Legal Committee) (1975).
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change was made; some believed that it was possible to live with
the present limit even if unbreakable, since the Convention provided that the shipper, unlike the passenger, could make a special
declaration of interest in delivery at destination under Article
22(2) (a) and normally took out insurance. A sudden increase
in the amount of the limit would go against the trend in air cargo,
since, with the availability of larger aircraft, the average value of
items carried was decreasing. It was necessary to ascertain the
proportion of claims covered by the present limit before deciding
whether a change in the limit was justified. It was believed that
any new figure must be used world-wide, although it was recognized
that delays in acceptance of the instrument would prohibit its coming into force for all states at the same time. Following this discussion, the subcommittee prepared a questionnaire on economic
data and recommended that it be forwarded to the states." '
2. Amount of the limit
In the Legal Committee it was pointed out that the amount of
the limit must be realistic and cover in full the vast majority of
claims. In addition, the economic position of the shipper and carrier as well as the costs of insurance should be considered. With
the increase of the value of the Poincar6 franc from $16 U.S. to
$20 U.S. per kilogram, the limit had already changed. The Committee was unable to make a decision on the limit and requested
the ICAO Council to make available to the proposed conference
up-to-date economic data relevant to determination of the amount
of the limit."'
After a brief discussion at the conference, the fourteenth meeting
of the Commission of the Whole rejected a United States proposal
that the limit of liability should be increased to $12 U.S. per
pound (approximately $27 or 333 Poincar6 gold francs per kilo111For questionnaire, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2

at 144 (1975).

The

information received from states and international organizations in response to
the questionnaire was analyzed by the ICAO Air Transport Committee and forwarded to the Legal Committee along with information presented by the ICAO

Secretariat. Id. at 157-86.
"' As a result of this request, the conference had before it W/H-CM Doc.

No. 19-Information Submitted by the Air Transport Bureau Concerning the
Value and Weight of Goods Carried by Air in International Trade, ICAO Doc.
9154-LC/174-2 at 117 (1975).
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gram) .113 Thus, no change was made in the limit of liability
applicable to the carriage of cargo. However, discussion of whether
the gold franc should be replaced as a unit of account was deferred
to another time.
3. Unbreakabilityof the limit

A substantial majority of the subcommittee favored an unbreakable limit within the system of strict liability, it being understood that, as a consequential action, Articles 9 and 25 would
have to be deleted, although the consignor would still have the
possibility of making a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination under Article 22. Both the Legal Committee and the
conference decided in favor of an unbreakable limit on liability
and therefore recommended that Articles 9 and 25 should be deleted. In particular, the deletion of Article 9 would mean that
liability limits could not be broken for absence or irregularity of
the document of carriage.11"
4. Method of calculating the limit

The subcommittee discussed whether the basis for calculation of
the limit should be the weight of the package or the weight of the
entire shipment. It was pointed out that there were certain disadvantages in the Warsaw/Hague rule of relating the limit to the
package, rather than to the shipment. For example, in the case
of a shipment which included packages of mixed values, in order
to protect himself the carrier would have to insure for the highest
value per kilogram which could lead to duplicate insurance. On
the other hand, in the case of a mixed shipment, the procedure was
too complicated to single out individual packages for special
declarations. Moreover, a shipment containing packages of mixed
values was necessary if a shipper was to get favorable freight
rates. As it was obvious that the matter required further study, the
subcommittee took no specific position on the matter. The Legal
Committee rejected a United States proposal to compute the limit
on the basis of the weight of the total shipment."'
At the seventeenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole,
113

By a vote of twenty-eight to four with eleven abstentions.

114

See S V(H) infra.

11By

a vote of thirty-three to two, with two abstentions.
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Qatar and the United Kingdom proposed"' the addition of a paragraph to Warsaw/Hague Article 22 providing that when a container or similar article of transport was used by or on behalf of
the consignor to consolidate cargo, it was to be considered as the
package for the purpose of the Article, unless the air waybill or
other record mentioned in Article 5(2) specified the contents as
separate packages. The proposal was rejected."
F. Article 23(2)-Cirumstances under which the carrier may be
relieved of liability for fixing a lower limit
Article 23 (2) was discussed at length during the Montreal Conference, and, in order that the summary given below may be understood, it is necessary to reproduce the Warsaw/Hague text of
Article 23."8 It reads:
(1) Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to
fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this Convention
shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provision does
not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain
subject to the provisions in this Convention.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply to provisions
governing loss or damage resulting from the inherent defect,
quality or vice of the cargo carried.
At the fourteenth and fifteenth meetings of the Commission of
the Whole there were several proposals concerning Article 23(2).
The Netherlands proposed replacing Article 23 (2) of the Warsaw/
Hague text by the following text: "Paragraph 1 of this Article
shall not apply to the provisions which relieve the carrier of the
obligation to take special measures to avoid damage resulting from
the nature or defect of the cargo carried.' ' 19 This proposal was
rejected.
IATA then presented a suggestion to extend the coverage of
Article 23(2) to the carriage of livestock or perishable cargo,"'
thus permitting the carrier and shipper to enter into a special con" 6 W/H-CM Doc. No. 43, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 166 (1975).
117 By a vote of twenty-two to nine, with eleven abstentions.
, For a discussion of problems arising out of Warsaw Convention Art. 23 (2),
see Drion, Exemption Clauses Governing Loss or Damage Resulting from the Inherent Defect, Quality or Vice of the Cargo, 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 329 (1962).
"' W/H-CM Doc. No. 35, at 2, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 150 (1975).
"'2 W/H-CM Doc. No. 7, at 2, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 69 (1975).
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tract covering this type of cargo and relieving the carrier of liability
under Article 23 (1) for fixing a lower limit than that specified in
the convention. This suggestion was rejected. Some of the speakers
found that the amendment was unnecessary since Article 23(2)
already covered the idea; others maintained that it went too far and
would permit the carrier to escape liability even if the damage
had been caused by his negligence. The United States then suggested removing the doubt about the interpretation of Article
23(2) that had prompted the IATA amendment by introducing
the word "solely" after "resulting" in the Warsaw/Hague text. The
provision would then read: "Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not
apply to provisions governing loss or damage resulting solely from
the inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carrier.''. A motion to reopen the debate on Article 23(2) failed.
G. Article 24-Conditions tinder which action may be brought
The Legal Committee's text of Article 24 read:
In the carriage of cargo, any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of
liability set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit
and what are their respective rights. Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever the
circumstances which gave rise to the liability." '2
At the fifteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole France
stated that since it had been decided to maintain the present low
limit of liability for cargo, the maintenance of Article 25 of the
Warsaw/Hague text was necessary to preserve a balance between
the legitimate rights of the shipper and the carrier. France requested separate votes on the two sentences in Article 24 of the
Legal Committee's text with a view to voting against the second
which was concerned with unbreakability of the limit.
Israel proposed the introduction of the words "in quasi-contracts" after "in contract" in the first sentence and addition of a
third sentence reading: "Action for damages for the purpose of
this Article shall include any action for restitution of the goods in
121W/H-CM-SRC/15,

"WW/H-CM

5 2 (1975).

Doc. No. 4, at 7, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 19 (1975).
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kind or for the restitution of the value of the goods, restitution of
freight or any unlawful enrichment. ' ' "u
However, this proposal was not seconded. The Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic proposed the deletion of the words "in tort or
otherwise" in the first sentence and of "whatever the circumstances
which gave rise to the liability" in the second. It was explained
that the consignor and consignee were more interested in having
the cargo reach its destination in good order than in receiving
compensation for it. Hence, if the carrier committed an illegal act
which caused damage to, destruction, or loss of cargo, he should
not escape with paying compensation within the limit provided in
the Convention. ' None of the proposals amending Article 24 were
accepted, and it was noted that acceptance of Article 24 of the
Montreal text meant deletion of Articles 25 and 25A of the Warsaw/Hague text insofar as they applied to cargo.
At the tenth plenary meeting, there were two proposals for
amending the replacement for Article 24 prepared by the Commission of the Whole. The first was a Netherlands proposal to delete the words "without prejudice to the question as to who are
the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their
respective rights" from paragraph 2 of Article 24.'" This proposal
was rejected. The second proposal, made by Brazil, to introduce
at the beginning of the second sentence of the same paragraph the
words "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) (1) of Article
22".... also was rejected.
Article 24 of Montreal Protocol No. 4 as finally adopted, reads:
1. In the carriage of passengers and baggage, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention, without prejudice to

the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring
suit and what are their respective rights.

2. In the carriage of cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
of liability set out in this Convention without prejudice to the
1

- W/H-CM-SRC/15, 5 3.2 (1975).

4
2

Id. 5 3.3 (1975).
1W/H-CM Doe. No. 68, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 233 (1975).
120W/H-CM-SRP/10, 5 5 (1975).
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question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit
and what are their respective rights. Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever the
circumstances which gave rise to the liability.
H. Articles 25 and 25A-Elimination of unlimited liability of the
carrier,his servants or agents in the case
of certain behaviour
Following the adoption of the principle of unbreakability of the
limit in the carriage of cargo, Warsaw/Hague Articles 25 and 25A
were amended to restrict breakability of the limit to cases of the
carriage of passengers and baggage. The new provisions in Montreal Protocol No. 4 read as follows:
Article 25
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits of liability
specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result; provided that, in
the case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also
proved that he was acting within the scope of his employment.
Article 25 A
3. In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the provisions of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply if it is proved
that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the servant
or agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.
At the tenth plenary meeting the United Kingdom proposed
to add to the revised text of Article 25 another paragraph reading:
"In the carriage of cargo, the limits of liability specified in Article
22 shall not apply if it is proved by criminal conviction that the
cargo was stolen by the carrier, his servants, or agents.'.. The
proposal did not obtain the two-thirds majority required for adoption and the United Kingdom also failed to achieve support for
a similar addition made to the new Article 25A(3)."'
127 Id.
128Id.

5 6.
5 7.
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I. Article 26(2)-Time-limit for complaints for non-delivery of
cargo
Warsaw/Hague Article 26(2) reads:
In the case of damage, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery of the damage,
and, at the latest, within seven days from the date of receipt in
the case of baggage and fourteen days from the date of receipt
in the case of cargo. In the case of delay the complaint must be
made at the latest within twenty-one days from the date on which
the baggage or cargo have been placed at his disposal.
In the Legal Committee the Soviet Union proposed to add to
Article 26(2) a provision that in case of total loss of goods, the
person entitled to delivery must complain within thirty days from
the date of the issuing of the air waybill. Article 26 did not mention any time within which a complaint must be lodged in the
case of the total loss of goods. The proposal was rejected.
At the conference the subject of time limitations was discussed
during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth meetings of the
Commission of the Whole. Nigeria proposed a new paragraph 2
in Article 29 of the Warsaw/Hague text providing that where the
"other means" for the preservation of the record of the contract
of carriage mentioned in Article 5 (2) had been used, a person who
wished to bring action for damage must give notice to the carrier
of his intention to do so no later than six months from the date
of arrival at the destination, from the date on which the aircraft
ought to have arrived, or from the date on which carriage
stopped." 9 Nigeria explained that it would discourage the use of
"other means" if the taped record had to be preserved for the twoyear period referred to in Article 29(1). During the discussion it
was pointed out that the two-year limit in Article 29(1) applied
to the institution of an action and that the Nigerian proposal introduced a new idea: notice of action. It was further suggested
that Article 26 would be a more appropriate place for the proposed
provision or that a sentence could be inserted in Article 5 (2) providing for the length of time during which the record should be
preserved when "other means" were used. Nigeria and the United
"'W/H-CM Doe. No. 37, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 157 (1975)
mitted by Nigeria).

(sub-
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Kingdom then presented a joint proposal..0 for the addition of a
provision to Article 26 giving the consignor, in the event of nondelivery or loss of the cargo, six months from the date on which
the cargo was consigned to file a complaint with the carrier. This
proposal also suggested the introduction of a new article or paragraph specifying how long the record of carriage referred to in
Article 5(2) should be preserved.
Meanwhile the Soviet Union proposed' supplementing Article
26(2) by providing that, in the event of total loss of cargo, the
claim shall be made by the person entitled to delivery within 120
days of the issuance of the air waybill or the recording of the particulars of the carriage using any "other means" as provided in
Article 5(2). It was then suggested that there might be an advantage in considering the new Soviet Union proposal in connection
with the revised Nigerian proposal, as they were somewhat related.
Nigeria next suggested that the Commission of the Whole vote
on the principle of time limitations instead of voting on the Nigerian and Soviet Union proposals and leave the preparation of
the consolidated text to the Drafting Committee. The Soviet Union
indicated that this would be acceptable if the Nigerian-United
Kingdom proposal were to include a period of 120 days instead
of a time-limit of six months. This was agreed. The United States
then proposed an amendment extending the period to one year,
explaining that even a six-months period was too short when a
small consignor, a long distance, and more than one carrier were
involved."' This amendment was rejected, however. The NigerianSoviet Union-United Kingdom principle of a 120-day period from
the date of consignment for the filing of a complaint of non-delivery or loss was also rejected, as well as the second part of the
Nigerian-United Kingdom proposal concerning the preservation
of the records referred to in Article 5(2). Thus, Article 26(2) of
the Warsaw/Hague regime remained unmodified.
J. Article 30A-Right of recourse
The new Article 30A, adopted by the Conference without dis130 W/H-CM Doc. No. 49, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 171 (1975) (NigeriaUnited Kingdom).
" W/H-CM Doc. No. 38, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 158 (1975) (Soviet
Union).
112 W/H-CM-SRC/19,
1 (1975).
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cussion, includes the following provision on the right of recourse:
"Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the question whether
a person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions has a
right of recourse against any other person." '
K. Article 33-Refusal to enter into a contract of carriage and
making of regulations
The revised Article 33 reads: "Except as provided in paragraph
3 of Article 5, nothing in this Convention shall prevent the carrier
either from refusing to enter into any contract of carriage or from
making regulations which do not conflict with the provisions of
this Convention." In accordance with a Nigerian proposal considered at the fifteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole
Article 33 has been amended to avoid any possible or apparent
conflict with the new Article 5(3). The latter provision prohibits
a carrier from refusing to accept cargo for carriage where it is impossible to use, at points of transit and destination, an electronic
data processing system which would preserve the record of the
carriage.
L. Article 34-Carriageperformed in extraordinary circumstances
The new text of Article 34 changes Warsaw/Hague Article 34
to refer to the non-application of "Articles 3 to 8" and not of "Articles 3 to 9" in the following circumstances: "The provisions of
Articles 3 to 8 inclusive relating to documents of carriage shall
not apply in the case of carriage performed in extraordinary circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's business."
The reference to Article 9 is no longer appropriate because of the
new drafting and the marked change in its role. ' "
M. Article 20-Delay
In the subcommittee it was agreed that the liability of the carrier
for damage occasioned by delay of cargo should be based on a
rebuttable presumption of fault on his part, as in the case of Guatemala City Protocol with respect to delay of passengers."

"IThis

provision which is found in Art. 10 of the Convention on Damage

Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310

U.N.T.S. 181, 186, was also included in the Guatemala City Protocol.
' See § IV(F) supra.
' This is similar to the rebuttable presumption of fault established by the
Guatemala City Protocol with respect to delay of passengers.
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The subcommittee agreed that economic data would be needed
before a decision could be made regarding the limit applicable to
damage caused by delay of cargo. It also agreed that there was
no need for a separate limit or different method of calculating the
limit in the case of delay unless the need was clearly demonstrated
by subsequently supplied economic data. No decision was reached
on the question of whether the limit should be unbreakable in
the case of delay.
The subcommittee also examined, but reached no decision on the
interpretational question of the "special declaration of interest in
delivery at destination," contemplated by Article 22(2)(a). One
interpretation of these words was that they contemplated only a
voluntary agreement about higher value between the shipper and
the carrier, while another interpretation was that the words gave
the shipper a right to make unilaterally a special declaration of
interest in delivery at destination and that the carrier must accept
the declaration, although he could require the shipper to pay a
supplementary sum. There was also a difference of opinion on
whether the words in question were restricted to a special declaration of "value" or whether they could include an interest in the
timely delivery of the cargo in addition to its safe arrival. After
further inconclusive discussion on the matter the subcommittee
decided that the differing views on the interpretation of Article
22(2) (a) should merely be recorded.
There was a clear majority opinion in the subcommittee favoring the system of unbreakability of the limit for delay of cargo,
necessitating the deletion of Warsaw/Hague Articles 9 and 25.
The Legal Committee decided to accept the recommendation of
the subcommittee that the carriers' liability for damage caused by
delay should be based on a rebuttable presumption of fault on
his part and that the limit of liability should be unbreakable."'
No decision on the amount of the limit was taken by the Committee. The conference followed the same line. Thus, Warsaw/
Hague Article 9 was left unchanged and Article 20 was changed
to read: "In the carriage of passengers and baggage, and in the
case of damage occasioned by delay in the carriage of cargo,
the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his servants
" By a vote of forty-three to zero, with one abstention.
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and agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage
or that it was impossible for them to take such measures." Moreover, revised Articles 2 and 25 provide no penalty in the case of
delay of cargo; hence, the limit of liability in the case of delay is
unbreakable.
VI. ARTICLE 2-AIRMAIL 7

Warsaw/Hague Article 2(2) provides that the convention does
not apply to carriage of mail and postal packages. In 1967 there
was a case in the United Kingdom where a claimant successfully
recovered damages from an air carrier in excess of the Warsaw
cargo limitation for a postal article.13 ' IATA brought this matter
to the attention of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) which in
1969 adopted a resolution leaving the matter unresolved."'
At the ICAO subcommittee session in 1972, the United Kingdom explained that according to the domestic law of several countries, the sender of the mail or the addressee might have the right to
sue the air carrier in tort regarding a postal article. In such a case,
the carrier might be held liable without any limit whatsoever. The
United Kingdom proposed that the carrier would be liable only and
exclusively to a postal administration and that the addressee or
sender of the mail would not have a right of action against the
air carrier. " In considering the possible liability of carriers in the
carriage of postal items, it is necessary to bear in mind that they
could not be expected, as in the case of cargo, to have opportunity
to gain knowledge of the contents of postal items, some of which
could be of great value. On the question of having the United
Kingdom proposal refer to the Acts of the UPU,4 1 it was indicated that some international carriage of mail by air was not regu137 For a suminary of the discussions on mail in the subcommittee and Legal
Committee, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 135-37 (subcommittee), 28-29, 51

(Legal Committee) (1975).
138 Moukataff

v. BOAC, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 396 (1967).

138 ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 at 335 (1970).
'*0ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 135 (1975).
141Art. 22 of the UPU Constitution lists Acts and Regulations which sup-

plement and complement the Constitution and together regulate all international
postal relations. For the text of the Constitution, which was adopted in 1964 and
came into force on January 1, 1966, see H. VAN PANHAYS, L. BRINKHORST, &
H. MAAS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION 412-18 (1968).
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lated by these Acts and that, moreover, the Acts covered only the
question of liability among postal administrations and did not refer
to the liability of the carrier."
The only result of the discussion was that the subcommittee
forwarded the following text of an Article A to the Legal Committee for discussion:
in the carriage of mail and postal packages, the carrier shall
be liable only to [the] [a] postal administration [with which the
carrier has concluded a contract]. [The carrier's liability shall be
determined in accordance with the regulations or contractual provisions applicable to the relations between the carrier and the
postal administration]."
The subcommittee also agreed that Article 2(2) should be replaced by the statement: "Except for the provisions of Article A,
this convention shall not apply to the carriage of mail or postal
packages."'"
In the Legal Committee in 1974 the United Kingdom once more
raised the air mail question. In its view, exposure of the carrier to
suit in tort without limitation of liability was unjust because the
carrier has no control over the contents of the mail bags and hence
cannot determine the value of the individual shipments and take
4 Part of the United Kingdom's proout the necessary insurance."'
posal before the Legal Committee was that the carrier's liability
vis-it-vis the postal administration should be determined in accordance with the contract between the carrier and the administration,
or in accordance with the statutory regulations governing the relations of the carrier with the postal authority. One further suggestion was that, with respect to insured or registered mail, the
carrier's liability should be limited to the amount of the statutory
liability of the postal administration, as determined in statutory
regulations or by contractual arrangements applicable between
the carrier and the postal administration for non-registered mail.
The Legal Committee approved in principle the proposal that the
carrier should be liable only and exclusively to the postal adminis42
4

ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 135 (1975).
at 137.

1Id.

144Id.

145d. at 28.
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tration with which he is dealing.'" It was decided that the new
instrument should not contain any specific rules as to the system
of liability applicable to the air carrier in its relations with the
postal administration."
The draft provisions prepared by the Legal Committee on this
topic emerged as Article 2(2) and read:
(2) In the carriage of mail and postal packages, the carrier shall
be liable only to the postal administration from which he received
such mail and packages. This liability shall be governed by the
rules applicable to the relationship between the carrier and the
postal administration.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this Article, the
provisions of this Convention shall not apply to the carriage of
mail and postal packages.
At its ninth meeting, the Commission of the Whole referred to the
Drafting Committee the suggestion of the UPU ' that the expression "mail and postal packages" be replaced by "postal articles".
The proposed amendment would conform more closely to relevant
UPU terminology.
The Commission then discussed a United Kingdom proposal
amending the first sentence of the Montreal draft of Article 2(2)
by replacing the words "the postal administration from which he
has received such mail and packages" with "the postal administration of the country in which mail and packages originated".1 "
The UPU explained that there were three possible modes of operation in the dispatch of mail involving transhipment: (1) Transhipment of mail from administration to administration where,
at each transhipment point, the carrier hands the mail over to a
postal administration which redispatches it; (2) carrier-to-carrier
transfer of mail, with the paper work being handled by the postal
administration; and (3) carrier-to-carrier transhipment without
actual intervention of the postal administration, although the immediate postal administration must always give its consent for such
transfer.
I" Id. The approval vote was forty to zero, with one abstention.
14 7

1 d. at 29.
48

W/H-CM Doc. No. 4, at 6, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 18 (1975).

4

"' W/H-CM Doc. 9, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 73 (1975).
15
0 W/H-CM-SRC/9, 5 7 (1975).
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The United Kingdom withdrew its proposal at the tenth meeting
of the Commission of the Whole and it was replaced by a joint
proposal of India and the United Kingdom to have paragraph 2
read: "In the carriage of mail and postal packages, the carrier shall
be liable only to postal administrations in accordance with the
rules applicable to the relationship between the carriers and the
postal administrations. 151 This amendment was carried at the same
meeting. Paragraph 3 was approved without discussion. Thereafter, the only changes made in the provisions were the insertion
of the expression "postal items" in two places to replace the expression "mail and postal packages" and the insertion in paragraph 2
of the word "relevant" before the word "postal administration".
The texts on air mail, as found in Montreal Protocol No. 4, are
as follows:
In the carriage of postal items the carrier shall be liable only
to the relevant postal administration in accordance with the rules
applicable to the relationship between the carriers and the postal
administrations.
Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, the provisions
of this Convention shall not apply to the carriage of postal items.
At the ninth plenary meeting, a proposal by the Norwegian delegation to eliminate the definite article before "carriers" in the last
line of paragraph (2) was withdrawn after some adverse comments 5' and the provisions concerning postal items were adopted
by a vote of 47 to 1. The new provision, although couched in
somewhat general terms, does achieve the purpose of the amendment: in the case of loss, damage or delay in the carriage of postal
items, the carriers would no longer be liable to persons who mailed
the items, but only to postal administrations.
VII.

ARTICLE
POINCAR

22-THE

UNIT OF ACCOUNT: THE SHIFT FROM THE

GOLD FRANC TO THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

A. Conversion of the Poincargfranc into nationalcurrencies
At the Legal Committee in 1974 there was considerable discusW/H-CM-SRC/10, 5J1 (1975).
"s'While the Norwegian proposal made sense, it should logically have also
provided for the deletion of the definite article before the words "postal admin:51
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sion about the conversion of the Poincar6 franc into national currencies. Since 1968 the free market price of gold no longer necessarily has corresponded to the price calculated for the official rates;
moreover, the price of gold on the free market of certain countries
was subject to significant variations at different times and places.
Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States therefore presented a
resolution which was subsequently adopted.1" According to the
resolution, the Committee expressed the opinion that, for the application of the various Warsaw instruments, the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface
(Rome 1952),1"' and in particular the Guatemala City Protocol,
the conversion of the sums fixed in Poincar6 francs into national
currencies other than gold should not be made on the basis of the
price of gold on the free market."=
Obviously, since the resolution received so few affirmative votes,
it could not be relied upon to afford a solution for problems caused
by the two-tier gold regime. Thus, it is not surprising that emphasis
was later given to finding a more certain unit of account for use in
the Warsaw system.
B. The Special Drawing Right
Following a recommendation by the Legal Committee, the ICAO
Council established a working group to consider potential conflicts
between cargo provisions of the new instrument and those of the
istrations." Further, since the text had only been drafted after lengthy discussions,

there was an understandable reluctance to disturb it at such a late stage in the
Conference.
15 By a low vote of seventeen to zero, with twenty abstentions.
' See note 133 supra.

1 For references to the currency question at the 21st session of the Legal
Committee, see ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 26, 38-41 (1975)

(paper presented

by Norway). The problem of the gold franc in the Warsaw and other conventions
has been discussed in several articles. See Heller, The Warsaw Convention and
the Two Tier Gold Market, 7 J. of WORLD TRADE L. 126 (1974); Heller, The
Value of the Gold Franc-A Different Point of View, 6 J. MARITIME L. & COM.
125-28 (1974). See also Arcari, Gold Clauses in International ConventionsProblems Raised by the Present Monetary Crisis, UNIDROIT ETUDES LVII-ICAO
Doc. 1/rev. U.D.P. (1973) (on behalf of the secretariat of UNIDROIT). See generally Reesmogg, When Gold was Money, THE OroWA JOURNAL, April 12, 1975,
at 9; Changed Ground Rules for Gold, BK. OF MONTREAL Bus. REV., October
1975, at 5.

1976]

THE FOUR MONTREAL PROTOCOLS

Guatemala City Protocol. ' During the session of the working
group in April 1975 the United States drew attention to an IATA
letter which noted that the Poincar6 gold franc was no longer an
adequate method for expressing limits of liability. A United States
paper""' appended to the working group's report referred to that
letter and stated that whatever method was used to express the
limits for cargo would also be suitable for the Guatemala City
Protocol; changing the "gold franc" clause of all the Warsaw instruments at the same time in Montreal would avoid conflicts about the
applicable limit of liability resulting from different methods of
expressing the limits.
The United States submitted that expressing the limits of liability
in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) would be a possible alternative." 8 Although the
United States did not make a formal proposal at the time, it did
point out the necessity of some preparatory work if the coming
Montreal Conference was to take action on the matter. The working group, however, considered the matter to be beyond its scope.
One of the documents before the conference was a proposal by
Norway. 9 to amend Warsaw/Hague Article 22, paragraphs 2(a)
and 5 in the new instrument on cargo in order to substitute the
Special Drawing Right as the unit of account in place of the Poincar6 gold franc. At the same time, Norway proposed to include
in the agenda of the Conference" the question of amending the
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City
Protocol to substitute the SDR as the unit of account for the
Poincar6 gold franc. In support of the proposal it was noted that
the SDR is a unit of account established by the International
Monetary Fund which has 126 member states and that JATA had
15 The Guatemala City Protocol also reproduces some cargo provisions of the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol.
' 'App. F, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 95-96 (1975).
158For an examination of the expression "Special Drawing Right," see Gold,
Special Drawing Rights. The Role of Language. International Monetary Fund
Pamphlet Series No. 15, at 1-25. See also SDR Valued by 16 Currencies, IMF
Press Release No. 74/29 (June 13, 1974), reproduced in 13 INT'L LEG. MAT.
1020 (1974). The method of valuation of SDR's described in the Press Release
became effective on July 1, 1974.
"I W/H-CM Doc. No. 23, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 125 (1975).
" The agenda was initially limited to revision of the cargo provisions in the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol.
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already adopted in principle the SDR for determining air fares and
for accounting purposes.
According to the Norwegian paper, the value of the SDR was
originally calculated on the basis of one SDR being equal to
0.888671 grams of fine gold and this was still the basic value of
the SDR. On July 1, 1974, however, the IMF had introduced an
SDR calculated on the basis of the value of sixteen national currencies which constituted a "basket". In the basket the currencies
had different weights. Norway intended the "basket SDR" to be
utilized as the unit of account in the air law conventions. The value
of one U.S. dollar was equivalent to SDR 0.809985 on July 1,
1975.
C. Inclusion of the Special Drawing Right in Montreal Protocol
No. 4 (Cargo provisions)
Meanwhile, a detailed proposal, presented to the conference by
Denmark, Egypt, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States,"' recommended that
Article 22, paragraph (2)(a) of the Warsaw Convention as amended
by the Hague Protocol should be amended to read: "In the carriage
of cargo, the liability of the carrier is limited to a sum of Special
Drawing Right... per kilogram .... "
Further, paragraph 5 should read:
The sums mentioned in terms of the Special Drawing Right in this
Article shall be deemed to refer to the Special Drawing Right as
defined by the International Monetary Fund. Conversion of the
sums into national currencies shall, in case of judicial proceedings,
be made according to the value of such currencies in terms of the
Special Drawing Right at the date of judgment. The value of a
national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a
Party which is a Member of the International Monetary Fund,
shall be calculated in accordance with the method of evaluation
applied by the International Monetary Fund, in effect at the date
of the judgment, for its operations and transactions. The value
of a national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right,
which is not a Member of the International Monetary Fund, shall
be calculated in a manner determined by that Party.
The Soviet Union, which was opposed to adoption of the SDR,
put forward this proposal:
"I

W/H-CM Doc. No. 44, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 167 (1975).
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Conversion of the sums into the national currency of the State,
the Court of which is seized of the case, shall be made according

to the official gold parity of the franc and the national currency
of that State at the date of judgment or at the date agreed upon by
the parties. Conversion of the francs into national currencies, of
which the official gold content is unknown, shall be made according
to the relationship between the currencies established by the legislation of the respective States."'

The Soviet Union proposal was supported by the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and Poland.
After a lengthy discussion the proposal for the adoption of the
SDR as the unit of account in the cargo instrument was carried
at the eighteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole by a
vote of 39 in favor and 9 against, with 5 abstentions." 3
When, at its twenty-sixth meeting, the Commission of the Whole
turned to consideration of the Drafting Committee's proposal which
ultimately became Montreal Protocol No. 4 dealing with cargo,
it had before it a text'" which called for replacement of paragraph
2(a) of Article 22 of the Warsaw/Hague text by a paragraph
2(a) (i) which dealt with the limit of liability for registered baggage, reproducing paragraph 2(a) of the Warsaw/Hague text

without the phrase "and of cargo" and referring to a limit of 250
francs per kilogram. In addition, the text contained a paragraph

2(a) (ii) on the limit of liability for cargo expressed in terms of
the SDR. The Commission decided to change the presentation of
the provision and merely to state that paragraph 2(a) of the

Warsaw/Hague text was amended by the deletion of the words
110W/H-CM Doc. No. 46, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 168 (1975).
I" In view of the importance of this decision which was taken on a roll-call
vote (one of the few such votes during the Montreal Conference), the detailed
record of the vote is given herewith: In favor: Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Arab Republic of Egypt, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon,
United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia (39).
Opposed: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (9).
Abstentions: Brazil, People's Republic of China, Ghana, Turkey, Zaire (5).
144 W/H-CM Doc. No. 57, Addendum No. 2, at 2, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2,
at 192 (1975).
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"and of cargo" and to insert after paragraph 2(a) the following:
b) In the carriage of cargo, the liability of the carrier is limited
to a sum of 17 Special Drawing Rights per kilogramme, unless the
consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed
over to the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that the sum is greater
than the consignor's actual interest in delivery at destination.
The present paragraph 2(b) was designated as paragraph 2(c).
In subparagraph (b) the Commission chose the whole figure "17"
instead of the alternative figure "16.58" to express the number of
Special Drawing Rights. Later, at the tenth plenary meeting, Kenya
and Tanzania attempted"5 to have the amount of 17 Special Drawing Rights in the proposed paragraph 2(b) of Article 22 replaced
by 16.58 which, in their view, was a closer approximation to the
existing limit of 250 francs. Their proposal was rejected. '
The second part of the Drafting Committee provisions on the
SDR called for introduction, after Article 22(5) of the Warsaw/
Hague text, of paragraph 6 on the conversion of sums expressed
in terms of the Special Drawing Right into national currencies.
The text of this provision was adopted at the twenty-sixth meeting
of the Commission.
The sums mentioned in terms of the Special Drawing Right in
this Article shall be deemed to refer to the Special DrawingRight
as defined by the International Monetary Fund. Conversion of the
sums into national currencies shall, in case of judicial proceedings,
be made according to the value of such currencies in terms of the
Special Drawing Right at the date of the judgment. The value of
a national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a
High Contracting Party which is a Member of the International
Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in accordance with the method
of valuation applied by the International Monetary Fund, in effect
at the date of the judgment, for its operations and transactions.
The value of a national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing
Right, of a High Contracting Party which is not a Member of the
International Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in a manner
determined by that High Contracting Party.
"'W/H-CM-SRP/10, 5 4 (1975).
"

By a vote of twenty to seven, with two abstentions.
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Belgium noted that some formula should also be included which
would be acceptable to states that were not members of the International Monetary Fund as well as to member states. Later, at the
eleventh plenary meeting, the Conference adopted the following
provision as a second subparagraph in Article 22(6):
Nevertheless, those States which are not Members of the International Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit the application of the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Article 22 may, at the
time of ratification or accession or at any time thereafter, declare
that the limit of liability of the carrier in judicial proceedings in
their territories is fixed at a sum of two hundred and fifty monetary
units per kilogramme. This monetary unit corresponds to sixty-five
and a half miligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred.
This sum may be converted into the national currency concerned
in round figures. The conversion of this sum into the national currency shall be made according to the law of the State concerned.
D. Inclusion of the Special Drawing Right in Additional Protocols
Nos. 1, 2 and 3
Since the question of including the SDR in the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City Protocol (as
distinct from the instrument containing the amended cargo provisions) required amendment of the agenda, this matter was discussed and voted on in the sixth plenary meeting. That session
considered two proposals:'" (a) A United States proposal to add
the sub-item "Consideration of possible protocol to the Guatemala
City Protocol (1) replacing the gold franc by the Special Drawing
Right in the provisions relating to the limits of the carrier's liability and (2) resolving the conflict between its cargo provisions
and those adopted by this Conference"; and (b) A Norwegian
proposal for a sub-item "Replacement of the gold franc by the
.Special Drawing Right in the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City Protocol relating
to the limits of the carrier's liability." Both the United States and
Norwegian proposals were adopted.
The SDR question was then debated at the twenty-first meeting
of the Commission of the Whole; it came before the Commission
"17 W/H-CM-SRP/6, 5 2 (1975).

See also W/H-CM Doc. No. 23, ICAO

Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 125 (1975) (Norway) and WH-CM Doc. No. 25, ICAO
Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 137 (1975) (United States).
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in a Norwegian proposal,"" as amended by the multipartite proposal."6 ' The Commission then decided to replace the gold franc
with the SDR in the Warsaw regime by the following series of historic votes:
Guatemala City Protocol: 30 to 10, with 6 abstentions,
The Hague Protocol: 36 to 10, with 6 abstentions, and
Warsaw Convention: 36 to 11, with 4 abstentions.17
Thus, Additional Protocols Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively amend
(a) The Warsaw Convention, (b) The Warsaw Convention as
amended at the Hague, 1955, and (c) The Warsaw Convention
as amended at the Hague 1955 and at Guatemala City, 1971, to
contain provisions revising the monetary unit. Except for the inclusion of appropriate limits, these Protocols are textually the same
as those found in Montreal Protocol No. 4.
VIII. FORM OF THE NEW INSTRUMENT
A. Avoidance of conflict between Montreal Protocol No. 4 and
the Guatemala City Protocol
In the Legal Committee several delegations noted a potential
conflict between the cargo provisions of the proposed new instrument and those of the Guatemala City Protocol, which also reproduced some provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended
by the Hague Protocol relating to cargo. Pursuant to a recommendation of the Committee to the ICAO Council, the Council
decided to appoint a small working group to present an analysis
and possible solutions to the problem of potential conflict at the
Montreal Conference. The working group met in April 1975 and
agreed that a clause of the type given below would resolve the conflict between the Guatemala City Protocol and the new protocol
168

W/H-CM Doc. No. 23, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 125 (1975).
W/H-CM Doc. No. 44, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 167 (1975).

16 9
70

1 The votes took place between 1715 and 1730 hours on September 17, 1975,
and were such as to indicate that a two-thirds majority of the conference, meeting
in plenary, would be available, thus opening the door to United States acceptance
of the Guatemala City Protocol provisions, although, as will be seen later, by a
somewhat complicated procedure. The votes were as follows: First half of United
States proposal: 38 for, 10 against and 2 abstentions; second part of United States
proposal: 28 for, 13 against and 5 abstentions; Norwegian proposal: 31 for, 10
against and 2 abstentions.

1976]

THE FOUR MONTREAL PROTOCOLS

relating to cargo for states which are parties to both instruments:'"
ARTICLE X

If two or more states are Parties both to the present Protocol
and to the Guatemala City Protocol of 8 March, 1971, the following rules shall apply between them:
a) The provisions resulting from the system established by the
present Protocol, concerning cargo and mail, shall prevail
over the provisions resulting from the system established by
the Guatemala City Protocol;
b) The provisions resulting from the system established by the
Guatemala City Protocol, concerning passengers and baggage, shall prevail over the provisions resulting from the system established by the present Protocol.""
This was not a specific text and there was a division of opinion in
the working group as to the best answer to the conflicts problem.
Sweden suggested a consolidated instrument relating to the carriage
by air of passengers, baggage and cargo," but the working group
found the proposal outside its terms of reference. That the proposal
had some merit is seen in the adoption by the conference of a resolution on the preparation of a consolidated text."
At the nineteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole
there were three proposals before the Conference:
1. A proposal by Poland and the Soviet Union' which was in
accord with the Legal Committee's recommendation, that the new
instrument should be a protocol to the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague;
2. A proposal by the United States'. that the cargo and mail
provisions adopted by the Conference should become amendments
to the Guatemala City Protocol as well as the Hague Protocol and
further, that the former, after amendment, might be adopted as
an independent new instrument entitled "The Warsaw Convention
as amended at the Hague, Guatemala City and Montreal";
"' For report of working group, see Attachment to W/H-CM Doc. No. 10,
ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 74 (1975).
"'W/H-CM Doc. No. 10, at 6, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 80 (1975).
" 3 W/H-CM Doc. No. 10, at 11-19, ICAO Doe. 9154-LC/174-2 at 83-91
(1975).
...
See S VIII (B)

infra.

"'W/H-CM Doc. No. 41, ICAO Doe. 9154-LC/174-2 at 161 (1975).
6
W/H-CM Doc. No. 25, ICAO Doe. 9154-LC/174-2 at 137 (1975).
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3. The multipartite proposal of Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom'. that a new consolidated instrument should be
prepared, entitled "The Warsaw Convention as amended at the
Hague and at Guatemala City and as amended and consolidated
at Montreal 1975."
Since the question was raised whether the second and third
proposals could be discussed before a decision by the conference
to add them to its agenda, the conference then met in its fifth
plenary meeting to discuss the matter. After an extensive discussion
on procedure during the fifth and sixth plenary meetings, the conference decided that the multipartite proposal fell within the agenda.' More of this proposal will be discussed later in this article.'
By a much wider majority, the conference also decided to include in the agenda the following sub-item proposed by the United
States: "Consideration of a possible protocol to the Guatemala
City Protocol (1) replacing the gold franc by the Special Drawing
Right in the provisions relating to the limits of the carrier's liability
and (2) resolving the conflict between its cargo provisions and
those adopted by this conference.'...
The conference then reverted to the Commission of the Whole
and discussed the form of the new instrument. The multipartite proposal for a consolidated convention was rejected.''
The conference then took up the United States proposal to resolve the potential conflict between the cargo provisions in Guatemala City Protocol and those adopted by the Montreal Conference. ' At the twenty-second meeting of the Commission of the
Whole, the United States announced that it would submit a proposal for the inclusion of two paragraphs in the final clauses of
the instrument under consideration. The proposal was intended,
in combination with Article X,"u to resolve the problem of con' 7 W/H-CM Doc. No. 36, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 152 (1975).
'Ts

By a vote of twenty-one to twenty with five abstentions.

§ VIII (B) infra.
180
W/H-CM-SRP/6 (1975).
's' By a vote of thirty-six to seventeen, with three abstentions.
's' For considerations of simplicity, it is not proposed that the complete evolution of this discussion be traced.
' See § VIII(A) supra.
"7°See
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flicts. The first paragraph would permit termination of the provisions of the Hague Protocol relating to passengers and baggage,
while the second paragraph would terminate the cargo provisions
of the Guatemala City Protocol.
The United States proposal1' was discussed at the twenty-third
meeting of the Commission of the Whole. The United States delegation explained that its proposal was based on two assumptions:
(1) that the conference could adopt two protocols: the Hague
Protocol as amended by the Montreal Protocol of 1975, containing new cargo provisions, as well as the unamended Hague (passenger and baggage) provisions, and the Guatemala City Protocol
as amended at Montreal in 1975, with the unamended Guatemala
City (passenger and cargo) provisions remaining; and (2) that
the final clauses for both new protocols would follow the same pattern. The United States pointed out that its proposal did not affect
states which were parties to both the Guatemala City Protocol,
concerning passengers and baggage, and the Montreal Protocol,
concerning cargo and mail, since Article X prepared by the Council working group resolved that case. Rather, the problem occurred
where a state was a party to one protocol but not to the other. It
was well known that the United States could not ratify the Hague
Protocol." Hence, if the cargo provisions in the Montreal Protocol
were attached to the Hague Protocol, including the passenger provisions of the latter, the United States would not accept that
package.
As a result of discussions in the Commission of the Whole, the
Committee on Final Clauses, and the plenary meetings of the Conference, the following key Final Clauses were adopted:
A. For inclusion, Additional Protocol No. 3 has been expanded
through some of the Final Causes quoted below to give life to the
Guatemala City Protocol18 :
4
18"
W/H-CM Doc. No. 54, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 180 (1975).

181A primary reason for United States inability to ratify the Hague Protocol
was that the passenger liability limitation was too low.
'"6Additional Protocol No. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 9147 (1975), was originally
intended to provide for the inclusion of the Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary Fund in the Guatemala City Protocol. The importance of Additional Protocol No. 3, including this particular provision, is such that there was
a roll-call vote on the Final Clauses in the Commission of the Whole:
In favor: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
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Article VII(2):
Ratification of this Protocol by any State which is not a Party
to the Warsaw Convention or by any State which is not a Party
to the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, or
by any State which is not a Party to the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City, 1971, shall
have the effect of accession to the Warsaw Convention as amended
at The Hague, 1955, at Guatemala City, 1971, and by the Additional Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975.1""
Article VIII(1):
As soon as thirty signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification of this Protocol, it shall come into force between them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the thirtieth
instrument of ratification. It shall come into force for each State
ratifying thereafter on the ninetieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article X(3):
As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any of
them of the Warsaw Convention in accordance with Article 39
thereof or of The Hague Protocol in accordance with Article
XXIV thereof or of the Guatemala City Protocol in accordance
with Article XXII thereof shall not be construed in any way as a
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague,
1955, at Guatemala City, 1971, and by the Additional Protocol
No. 3 of Montreal, 1975.
Article XI( 1 ) (c) :
Any State may declare at the time of ratification of or accession
to the Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975, or at any time thereafter,
that it is not bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
as amended at The Hague, 1955, at Guatemala City, 1971, and
Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad, Tobago, United Kingdom, United States of America (29).
Opposed: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cuba,
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Jordan,
Polish People's Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Zaire (12).
Abstentions: Algeria, People's Republic of China, Arab Republic of Egypt,
Iraq, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Romania, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda (14).
'STMontreal Protocol No. 4, ICAO Doc. 9148 (1975) is concerned with the
amendment of the cargo and mail provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague, as well as the inclusion of the Special Drawing Right of the
International Monetary Fund in the new provisions.
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by the Additional Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975, in so far as
they relate to the carriage of cargo, mail and postal packages. Such
declaration shall have effect ninety days after the date of receipt
by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the declaration.
B. For inclusion in Montreal Protocol No. 4:
Article XVII(2)
Ratification of this Protocol by any State which is not a Party
to the Warsaw Convention or by any State which is not a Party
to the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955,
shall have the effect of accession to the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975.
Article XVIII (1)
As soon as thirty signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification of this Protocol, it shall come into force
between them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the thirtieth
instrument of ratification. It shall come into force for each State
ratifying thereafter on the ninetieth day after the deposit of its
instrument of ratification.
Article XX (3)
As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any
of them of the Warsaw Convention in accordance with Article
39 thereof or of The Hague Protocol in accordance with Article
XXIV thereof shall not be construed in any way as a denunciation
of the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and
by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975.
Article XXI(1)(b)
Any State may declare at the time of ratification of or accession to the Additional Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975, or at
any time thereafter, that it is not bound by the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and by
Protocot No. 4 of Montreal, 1975, in so far as they relate to the
carriage of passengers and baggage. Such declaration shall have
effect ninety days after the date of receipt of the declaration by the
Government of the Polish People's Republic.
In the case of Additional Protocol No. 3, the combined effect of
Articles VII(2) and VIII(1) is to revise Article XX(1) of the
Guatemala City Protocol. That article provides that the Guatemala
City Protocol will enter into force on the ninetieth day after the
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deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, subject to the
following weighted formula..:
On condition, however, that the total international scheduled air
traffic expressed in passenger-kilometers according to the statistics
for the year 1970 published by the International Civil Aviation
Organization, of the airlines of five states which have ratified this
Protocol, represents at least 40% of the total international scheduled air traffic of the airlines of the member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
This weighted formula may be avoided through the use of the
Final Clauses of Additional Protocol No. 3, instead of the Final
Clauses of the Guatemala City Protocol. Additional Protocol No.
3 provides in Article VIII(1) that it shall come into force on
the ninetieth day after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of
ratification since no weighted formula is applicable. This paves
the way for earlier implementation of the substantive provisions of
the Guatemala City Protocol.
Article X(3) of Additional Protocol No. 3, with its special provision on denunciation, enables a state, without having to be a party
to the original Warsaw Convention or to the Hague Protocol, to
be tied into the provisions of the Warsaw regime if the state ratifies
or adheres to Additional Protocol No. 3.
Finally, through the mechanism of a declaration, Article
XI(1) (c) enables a state to be a party to Montreal Protocol No. 4
without being bound by the Warsaw provisions as amended by the
various protocols up to and including Additional Protocol No. 3,
as those provisions relate to carriage of cargo, mail and postal
packages.
The effect of these various provisions may be illustrated by
examining their impact on the United States. The United States is
a party to the original Warsaw Convention, but is not, and does
not wish to become, a party to The Hague Protocol. Even if it
denounced the Warsaw Convention and refused to become a party
to The Hague Protocol, it can nevertheless be tied into the Guatemala City provisions on passengers and baggage by ratifying Addi" The formula was really aimed at insuring that the Protocol would not enter
1
into force without the participation of the United States, which, as compared with
other states, has a high amount of scheduled air traffic expressed in terms of
passenger-kilometers.
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tional Protocol No. 3. Should the United States wish to become a
party to Montreal Protocol No. 4, it can avoid applying the Guatemala City provisions"" relating to the carriage of cargo, mail and
postal packages through the declaration mechanism of Article
XI(1) (e). It would then only apply the relevant provisions of
Montreal Protocol No. 4.
The most important effect of the Final Clauses in Additional
Protocol No. 3 is that the United States, without whose participation the Warsaw regime would lose much of its importance, can
be kept in the Warsaw regime and tied into the passenger and
baggage provisions of the Guatemala City Protocol without having
to ratify that Protocol. It is also conceivable that other states which
are already parties to the original Warsaw Convention or to The
Hague Protocol may wish to retain their treaty relationships under
those instruments and at the same time become parties to Additional Protocol No. 3.
Before the Final Clauses of Additional Protocol No. 3 are left
aside, attention should be drawn to a further problem. Additional
Protocol No. 3, in dealing with The Special Drawing Right, includes a revised version of Article 22 of the Guatemala City
Protocol, giving rise to two questions: (1) Can the Guatemala
City Protocol, if not yet in force, in fact be amended by the later
Additional Protocol No. 3? (2) If so, can Additional Protocol No.
3 enter into force before the Guatemala City Protocol?
The Montreal Conference in effect gave an affirmative answer to
the first question by adopting Additional Protocol No. 3. The second question caused the expression of differing views. Although
one view asserts that Additional Protocol No. 3 could not enter
into force before the Guatemala City Protocol which it seeks to
amend, it may be observed that Articles VII(2) and VIII (1) of
Additional Protocol No. 3 provide machinery for giving life to
the substantive provisions of the Guatemala City Protocol without
the necessity of its ratification. Thus, it may be argued that Additional Protocol No. 3, which in effect incorporates by reference
the substantive provisions of the Guatemala City Protocol, is independent of the Guatemala City Protocol and that the existence and
89

' Which are now outstepped by Montreal Protocol No. 4, ICAO Doe. 9148
(1975).
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entry into force of Additional Protocol No. 3 does not depend on
the entry into force of the Guatemala City Protocol.
As in the case of Additional Protocol No. 3, the Final Clauses
of Montreal Protocol No. 4 permit a state which is not a party to
the Warsaw Convention or to that convention as amended at The
Hague to be tied into the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955 and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal,

1975 merely by ratifying Montreal Protocol No. 4. Through the
denunciation provisions in Montreal Protocol No. 4, a state is free
to sever its treaty relationships with states that are parties only to
the original Warsaw Convention or The Hague Protocol. Moreover, the Final Clauses in Montreal Protocol No. 4 provide that
when a state ratifies or accedes to Additional Protocol No. 3, or at
any time thereafter, it may declare that it is not bound by the
provisions on the carriage of passengers and baggage as found in
the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and by
Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975. The declarations are permitted

because the provisions relating to the carriage of passengers and
baggage are found in their most up-to-date form in the combination of the Guatemala City Protocol and Additional Protocol No.
3, and not in the combination of The Hague Protocol and Montreal Protocol No. 4.
It remains to be seen whether states will be able to sort out the
extraordinarily complicated Final Clauses discussed above and
prepare the rational legislation necessary to give effect to the new
Warsaw regime. The legislation must preserve orderly relationships
with other states within the regime despite its multiplicity of protocols and lack of uniform participation. '
9
IThe importance of Additional Protocol No. 3, ICAO Doe. 9147 (1975),
was such that a roll-call vote on the Final Clauses was called in the Commission
of the Whole:
In favor: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,

Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, India,

Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago,
United Kingdom, United States of America (29).
Opposed: Bulgaria, Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cuba,
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Jordan,
Polish People's Republic, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic, Zaire (12).
Abstentions: Algeria, People's Republic of China, Arab Republic of Egypt,
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B. Proposalsfor the preparationof a consolidatedconvention
There was the general preference in the subcommittee that the
amendment to the cargo and mail provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol should be made in the
form of a protocol and that no new convention should be drafted.
In the Legal Committee most delegations held the same view. It
was argued that drafting a new convention at that stage in four
languages (English, French, Russian and Spanish) would cause
considerable practical difficulties because of the language variations in the existing Warsaw/Hague text. Some provisions were
authentic only in the French language while other provisions were
authentic in English, French and Spanish, the text in French prevailing in case of any inconsistency.'91 Also, the Warsaw/Hague
text contained provisions that had common application to passengers, baggage and cargo; it would be difficult to divide the text
and prepare a new convention for cargo and mail only. Adherents
to the other school of thought supported such a convention and
considered the present plurality of instruments (original Warsaw
Convention, the Hague Protocol, Guadalajara Convention and
Guatemala City Protocol) to be confusing. They asserted that to
add still a further protocol would give rise to greater confusion.'"
In reply, it was stated that in other fields' " the amendment by a
series of successive protocols had worked well. Some delegations
took a middle position that for the present the amendment should
be made in the form of a protocol, but that at some other stage
the Legal Committee should study the possible consolidation of all
the texts into a new instrument relating to passengers, baggage,
cargo and mail. ' "
At the end of the discussion in the Legal Committee twentyeight delegations expressed a preference for the new instrument in
Iraq, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Romania, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda (14).
"I ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 29 (1975). A similar proposal arose during
the Guatemala City Conference. See ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 at 219-27 (1971);
ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 at 115-17 (1971). See also FitzGerald, supra note 4,

at 245-47.

"'ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 29 (1975).
"uSuch as involved in the Paris Convention on Industrial Property, March 20,
1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379.

'"Doc.9131-LC/173-2 at 29 (1975).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the form of a protocol; five delegations were in favor of the new
convention, and five abstained. It was understood that this vote
would not prevent further study of a possible future consolidation
of all existing instruments and that the new protocol would be
independent of the Guatemala City Protocol in the sense that states
could be parties to the new instrument without being or becoming
parties to the Guatemala City Protocol.'
As mentioned earlier in this article, at the Montreal Conference
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in the Commission of the Whole proposed a consolidated new convention.9 "
It should be recalled here that, during the meetings of the
ICAO Council working group on the question of potential conflicts between the new instrument on cargo and the Guatemala
City Protocol, Sweden had presented a proposal for a consolidated new instrument on the carriage by air of passengers, baggage
and cargo. The sponsors of the consolidation proposal in the
conference believed that the new convention could be prepared
along the lines proposed by Sweden. They proposed that the convention contain these seven chapters: I. General definitions and
the rules regarding the scope of the convention; II. The Guatemala City passenger and baggage provisions; III. The new cargo
rules; IV. The new provision on the carriage of mail; V. and VI.
The provisions of a general character in the Warsaw Convention
as amended at the Hague, and VII. Final clauses. The consolidated convention would not include any material concerning passengers and baggage not found in the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Guatemala City Protocol.
The sponsors of the proposal pointed out that it was necessary
to bear in mind while drafting the new convention that some
states were not prepared to accept both the Guatemala City passenger and baggage provisions and the proposed new provisions
relating to cargo. A draft final clause would make it possible for
states to become parties to the new cargo provisions without being
or becoming parties to the Guatemala City Protocol passenger
and baggage provisions and vice versa. States which did not ad'95
Id.
' 9 6W/H-CM Doc. No. 36, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 152 (1975).
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here to the Guatemala City passenger and baggage provisions thus
would continue to be bound by the old passenger and baggage
provisions in relation to all states which had not renounced the
older instruments. States which did not adhere to the new cargo
provisions would continue to be bound by the old provisions in
relation to states which had not denounced those instruments.
Also, states which adhered to the whole or part of the new instrument could continue to be bound by the provisions contained in
the Warsaw Convention or the Warsaw Convention as amended
at the Hague in relation to states which were not parties to the
new instrument.
When the proposal for a consolidated convention was before
the Commission of the Whole at its nineteenth meeting, Venezuela proposed a resolution requesting the ICAO Legal Committee to prepare a consolidated text for submission to the next session
of the ICAO assembly or some other appropriate meeting.19 Kenya
then raised the procedural question whether the Commission could
discuss the matter before a conference decision amending the
agenda. The conference convened its fifth plenary meeting to consider the question. During that meeting the President expressed
the opinion that the multipartite proposal for a consolidated instrument fell within the agenda, but said that he would prefer to
leave the decision to the conference. As already seen earlier in
this article,"' the Conference in its sixth plenary meeting indicated... that it considered the proposal for a consolidated convention to be within the agenda. During the twentieth and twentyfirst meetings the Commission of the Whole discussed the multipartite proposal for a consolidated Convention as well as the Polish
and the Soviet Union proposal"' that the new instrument take
the form of a protocol. At the twenty-first meeting of the Commission of the Whole, the Conference rejected the multipartite
proposal."'
Later, at the twenty-seventh meeting of the Commission of the
97

W/H-CM Doc. No. 53, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 179 (1975).
1 See § VIII(A), supra.
119By a vote of twenty-one to twenty with five abstentions.
2 0
W/H-CM Doc. No. 41, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 161 (1975).
201 By a vote of thirty-six to seventeen with three abstentions.
1
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Whole, the Venezuelan proposal.' was given detailed examination
and, after amendments,"°' was adopted.' The resolution in its definitive form is found in the Final Act of the Conference"°' which
was adopted at the twelfth plenary meeting."' The resolution provides, in acordance with the established procedure, that the necessary measures be taken for the ICAO Legal Committee to study
and prepare a draft of a consolidated text. This new text would
make no substantive change in existing instruments pertaining to
the Warsaw Convention itself or as amended or supplemented,
except as such change is necessary to maintain consistency within
the consolidated text. It also provides that the draft of the consolidated text be examined at a conference to be convened by the
ICAO Council in accordance with the established procedure as
soon as possible. In November 1975 the ICAO Council decided
that a subcommittee of the ICAO Legal Committee would meet
in May 1976 to prepare a draft consolidated text. The decision
to proceed with the work of consolidation could give rise to some
difficulties since work on the preparation of a consolidated text
could deter states from taking the necessary steps to become parties to instruments adopted during the Montreal Conference. The
project is going forward; it is left to the various states to decide
whether a mere consolidation of existing instruments, as distinct
from preparation of a new convention, would have the effect of
deterring participation in the Montreal instruments.
IX.

AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN MONTREAL PROTOCOL

No. 4

(CARGO PROVISIONS)

AND A POSSIBLE CONVENTION

ON INTERNATIONAL COMBINED TRANSPORT OF GOODS

In September and October 1972 the subcommittee decided that
it was futile to discuss possible conflicts between the Warsaw/
Hague system cargo provisions and the possible Convention on
02

1W/H-CM Doc. No. 53, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 179 (1975).

alia, the amendment provided for: (1) action to be taken pursuant
to established ICAO procedures; (2) No substantive changes to be made in the
203Inter

existing Warsaw Instruments by the draft consolidated text; and (3)

Placement

of the draft text before an ICAO-convened conference as soon as possible.
210

05

By a vote of thirty to eight with ten abstentions.

ICAO Doc. 9144 (1975).
108 By a vote of forty-eight to zero, with five abstentions.
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International Combined Transport of Goods because at the
UN/IMCO Conference on International Container Traffic (then
scheduled to be held in November 1972), there would be merely
an exchange of views on a draft convention."'
At the subcommittee meeting, the United States proposed extension of the air carrier's liability to the surface portion of an intermodal journey. This proposal is not without interest because of the
increased intermodality of carriage. Although Warsaw/Hague
Articles 31 and 18 restrict the rebuttable presumption of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention to damage occurring
during the course of the air transportation, that liability regime is
extended to what are essentially surface operations such as loading,
delivery and transhipment (Article 18 (3)). Building on this base,
the United States suggested extending the liability of the air carrier
so that he would be liable for damage occurring on an intermodal
shipment. A reason given in support of this proposal was that it
was already common practice for airlines, by contract, to assume
through-liability for intermodal journeys involving truck transport.
Proration of the loss or damage payments was settled later between
the carriers or their insurance companies. This suggested extension
of the air carrier's liability would be in addition to the remedies
the consignor or consignee might have against any other person or
carrier involved in the intermodal transportation.
When the same proposal was made to the Legal Committee in
1974, it was pointed out that since problems of intermodal transport were under active study in the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it would not be proper to
make any decision for air carriage. The only committee action
taken on the United States suggestion was a request to the ICAO
Secretariat to follow the progress of work in the UNCTAD on intermodal transport of cargo and to present an up-to-date report to
the Montreal Conference of 1975."'
207ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 130 (1975). Previously, at its Nineteenth
Session (Montreal, May 22-June 21, 1972), the Legal Committee when engaging
in a detailed examination of the implications for international civil aviation of

the proposed Convention on the International Combined Transport of Goods,

agreed that its task was not to make recommendations for amendment of the
air law conventions included in the Warsaw system so as to accommodate the
TCM Convention. ICAO Doc. 9096-LC/171-2 at 15 (1974).
"'ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 27 (1975).
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The Montreal Conference had before it an Austrian paper proposing that, with respect to the proposed combined transport convention, the difficulties resulting from Article 31 should be eliminated by the Conference. It was proposed that Article 31(2) be
eliminated and that the words "apply only to the carriage by air"
in Article 31 (1)should be replaced by "apply only to the contract
concluded with respect to the air transport. 2.9 The conference took
no action on the question of combined transport, however.
V. CONFLICT BETWEEN MONTREAL PROTOCOL No.

4

AND

CONVENTIONS ON LIABILITY IN RESPECT TO THE
CARRIAGE OF NUCLEAR SUBSTANCES

In 1972 the subcommittee reached no decision on a solution
for the possible conflict between the Warsaw/Hague cargo provisions and such conventions as the convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris, July 29, 1960)2.
and the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
(Vienna, May 21, 1963).211 In 1974 the Legal Committee's attention was again drawn to the same question. Both these conventions
impose exclusive liability on the operator of a nuclear installation,
although both contain a clause that they shall not affect the application of any international convention in the field of transport in
force or open for signature, ratification or accession at the date
when the convention is opened for signature.2 ' The view was expressed that the conflict of the nuclear liability conventions with
the Warsaw/Hague cargo provisions might expose air carriers to
liability of unacceptable and uninsurable magnitude. It was therefore suggested that the new instrument on cargo provide that the
air carrier would not be liable if the operator of the nuclear installation is liable under the Paris and Vienna conventions. The
opposition argued that the limit of liability stipulated in the new
instrument on the carriage of cargo by air would be unbreakable
under any circumstances; furthermore, the carrier would have the
right of recourse against the operator of the nuclear installation.
"°gW/H-CM Doc. No. 18, Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 116 (1975).
AMERICAN J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961).
212 INT'L LEG. MAT. 727 (1963).
21055

2"Paris Convention, Art. 6(b); Vienna Convention, Art. 11(5).
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The Committee disposed of this matter by asking the ICAO Secretariat to seek relevant information from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) for presentation to the Montreal Conference."'
At the Montreal Conference the Commission of the Whole, at its
seventeenth meeting, had before it a Swedish proposal to include
in the new instrument the following provisions?" taken from Article
20 of the Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
Their Luggage by Sea:
No liability shall arise under this Convention for damage caused
by a nuclear incident:
(a) if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such
damage under the Paris Convention of 29 July, 1960 on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as
amended by its Additional Protocol of 28 January, 1964,
or the Vienna Convention of 21 May, 1963, on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, or
(b) if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such
damage by virtue of a national law governing the liability
for such damage, provided that such law is in all respects as
favourable to persons who may suffer damage as either the
Paris or the Vienna Conventions."'
As a number of difficulties concerning the Swedish proposal arose
during the initial debate, the Australian delegation proposed that
the text read:
No liability shall arise under this Convention for damage to
cargo caused by a nuclear incident, if the operator of a nuclear
installation is liable for such damage under an international convention or national law governing liability for nuclear damage
which is applicable and is in all respects as favourable to persons
who suffer damage as the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
as amended by this protocol."'
At the nineteenth meeting of the Commission of the Whole, Italy
proposed to add to the Australian text the clause "to which the
parties to the present instrument are also parties" after "internaICAO Doc. 913 1-LC/173-2 at 27-28 (1975).
" 4 W/H-CM Doc. No. 12, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 101 (1975).
"' Athens, December 1974.
" W/H-CM-SRC/17, 5 3 (1975).
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tional convention".'" This proposal was not seconded. During the
ensuing discussion, the Australian text was criticized by some as
being too general; however, others defended it as more specific
than the Swedish text because the Australian text referred to damage "to cargo." It was stated that the Australian text had the advantage of avoiding a reference to the Paris and Vienna Conventions on liability for nuclear damage to which many states represented at the Conference were not parties. The Commission of the
Whole rejected both the Swedish and Australian proposals.
Sweden raised the matter again at the thirty-first session of the
Commission of the Whole, proposing inclusion of the following
reservation clause in Article XX(1) of Montreal Protocol No. 4:
A State which is a Party to the Paris Convention of 29 July,
1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy or
the Vienna Convention of 21 May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage may at any time of its ratification of or accession
to this Protocol or at any time thereafter declare by a notification
addressed to the Government of the Polish People's Republic that
it shall not be bound by the Warsaw Convention as amended at
The Hague, 1955, and at Montreal, 1975 by Protocol No. 4, in
respect of nuclear damage if the operator of a nuclear installation
is liable for the damage under the Paris or Vienna Convention
as the case may be."1 8
This proposal was not adopted, however.
XI. FINAL CLAUSES
Reference has already been made 1 to the provision for reservations to the respective instruments to avoid conflicts between Montreal Protocol No. 4 (which contains the cargo and mail provisions,
as well as provisions on the Special Drawing Right) and Additional Protocol No. 3 (which is primarily concerned with inclusion of the Special Drawing Right in the Guatemala City Protocol
provisions relating to passengers and baggage). There are, however, other interesting final clauses contained in the four protocols.
Because of space restrictions, it is impossible to cover each in deW/H-CM-SRC/19, 5 2 (1975).
W/H-CM Doe. No. 71, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-2 at 236 (1975).
219 See § VIII(A), supra.
117
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tail; however, a brief examination may be made of most of these
provisions in the context of Montreal Protocol No. 4.
Each of the protocols will come into force on the ninetieth day
after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification and will
come into force for each state ratifying thereafter on the ninetieth
day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification."'
As between the parties to Protocol No. 4, the Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague in 1955 and the new protocol shall
be read and interpreted together as one single instrument and
known as the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955,
and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975."1 A similar provision is
found in the other three protocols.
After Montreal Protocol No. 4 has come into force it will be
open for accession by any non-signatory state. Accession to the
Protocol by any state which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention or by any state which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention
as amended by the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of accession
to the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and
by Protocol No. 4 Montreal, 1975.2 Similar provisions are found
in the other three protocols.
There is, of course, provision for denunciation of Montreal
Protocol No. 4. In particular, it is specified that as between the
parties to the Protocol, denunciation by any of them of the Warsaw Convention in accordance with Article 39 thereof or of the
Hague Protocol in accordance with Article XXIV thereof shall
not be construed in any way as a denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955 and by Protocol No.
4 of Montreal, 1975.' A similar provision is found in the three
other protocols.
Besides the very special provisions concerning reservations"
there is also a provision which permits a state at any time to declare
220 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol No. 4, Art. XVIII(1), ICAO Doc. 9148 at
E-5 (1975).
221Id. at Art. XV, ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-4 (1975).

u1Id. at Art. XIX(1) & (2), ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-5 (1975).
Id. at Art. XX, ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-5 (1975).
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These have already been mentioned in connection with the issue of potential
conflicts between Montreal Protocol No. 4 and Additional Protocol No. 3.
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by notification addressed to the Polish Government2 that the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol
No. 4 Montreal, 1975 shall not apply to the carriage of persons,
baggage and cargo for its military authorities on aircraft, registered
in that state, the whole capacity of which has been reserved by or
on behalf of such authorities. ' The reservation may be withdrawn
at any time."2 Similar provisions are found in Additional Protocols
Nos. 2 and 3; however, no reservation may be made to Additional
Protocol No. 1.
As between the parties to Montreal Protocol No. 4 which are
also Parties to the Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw
Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a person other than the
Contracting Carrier(GuadelajaraSeptember 18, 1961), any reference to the "Warsaw Convention" contained in the Guadalajara
Convention shall include reference to the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and by Protocol No. 4 Montreal,
1975, in cases where the carriage under the agreement referred to
in Article 1, paragraph (b) of the Guadalajara Convention is
governed by Montreal Protocol No. 4."'
XII. CONCLUSION
Although the Montreal Conference started out with the relatively modest aim of revising the cargo provisions of the Warsaw
system, it wound up by effecting far-reaching changes in the whole
system. In particular, the replacement of the Poincar6 gold franc
as the unit of account in the Warsaw system by the Special Drawing Right will, when the relevant protocols come into force, remove the uncertainty that has existed in recent years because of
the two-tiered regime for the value of gold.
2

11

'

The Polish Government is the depository of Montreal Protocol No. 4.
Montreal Protocol No. 4, Art. XXI(1) (a), ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-5 (1975).

22Id. at Art. XXI(2), ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-5 (1975).

226 Id. at Art. XXIII, ICAO Doc. 9148 at E-5 (1975). Art. I(b) of the Guadalajara Convention provides:
'contracting carrier' means a person who, as a principal, makes an
agreement for carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention with
a passenger or consignor with a person acting on behalf of the passenger of consignor.
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Another important result of the conference is that Additional
Protocol No. 3, which is intended to provide for the incorporation
of the Special Drawing Right into the Guatemala City Protocol,
in reality enables a state to become a party to the Guatemala City
provisions merely by ratifying Additional Protocol No. 3 without
the necessity of ratifying the Guatemala City Protocol itself. Ratification is coupled with the complex system of denunciations of
older Warsaw instruments described earlier in this article." 9 One
effect of the machinery included in the Final Clauses of Additional Protocol No. 3 is removal of the condition stipulated in Article XX of the Guatemala City Protocol. Thus, failure of the total international scheduled air traffic"o of the airlines of five states which
have ratified the Guatemala City Protocol to represent at least forty
percent of the total international scheduled air traffic of the airlines
of the ICAO member states in that year will not prevent the Protocol's entry into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit of
the thirtieth instrument of ratification.
Upon their entry into force, the revision of the cargo provisions
of the Warsaw system, while not simplifying the requirements for
documentation to the extent hoped for prior to the Conference, will
have the virtue of not hindering the use of electronic data processing in the movement of air cargo, resulting in savings of paper
work and related costs.
Although the debate will no doubt continue as whether the strict
liability regime 1 is really more onerous than the present regime of
presumed liability, it can be argued that the existence of the new
regime may promote settlements without claimants and carriers
having recourse to litigation, which could result in reduced insurance costs.
Finally, the adoption of the resolution concerning preparation
of a consolidation of all of the Warsaw instruments, with the exception of the Guadalajara Convention, could cause some uneasiness among those states which are desirous of ratifying some of
the four protocols adopted at Montreal. They may now hesitate to

11 See
2

30

S VIII(A), supra.
As expressed in passenger-kilometers, according to ICAO statistics published

for the year 1920.
231 Which will become applicable to cargo when Montreal Protocol No. 4,
ICAO Doc. 9148 (1975), enters into force.
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do so pending the preparation of the consolidated convention.
Nevertheless, it is fair to predict that the decisions taken at the
Montreal Conference constitute a watershed in the long and controversial history of the Warsaw Convention.

